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The Right Attitude for the Program Manager Douglas R. Broome
The Chief of the Astrophysics Division's Flight Programs Branch of the Office of Space Science and Applications
(OSSA) reflects upon the specific characteristics and attributes expected in the Division's managers.
Program Control for Mission Success G.W. Longanecker
The senior principal staff member in the Space Science and Applications Group of BDM International, Inc., and
former Director of Flight Projects at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) offers practical advice and a com-
mon sense approach to program control.
Performance Measurement: A Tool for Program Control Nancy Abell
Abell was recently selected as the Chief of the Administration and Resources Management Office of Goddard's
Space Sciences Directorate. Her 19 years of program analysis and financial and resources management culmi-
nated in developing and implementing the Center's Performance Measurement System.
Managing SRM &QA Throughout the Project Life Cycle George A. Rodney
An Associate Administrator explains how managers can get the best from their SRM&QA engineering and tech-
nical support by incorporating principles of Total Quality Management to conserve money and time while ensur-
ing safer mission performance.
Advantages of Cost Plus Award Fee Contracts William C. Keathley
Personal and shared experiences convince this veteran that a cost plus award fee contract is preferred for high-
teeh, one-of-a-kind development projects. The former Associate Director of Programs at the Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) offers nine reasons why, plus lessons learned from fee determinations.
COBE: Lessons Learned from the Management of FIRAS Mike Roberto
The systems engineer for the Far Infrared Absolute Spectrophotometer (FIRAS) instrument on the recently
launched Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) does an instant analysis of a dozen management problems and
offers solutions while they are still fresh in his mind.
Management of Small Projects: Streetfighting in the NASA System William J. Huffstetler
The Manager of New Initiatives at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) shares his experiences in the art of street-
fighting in the NASA system, suggesting that small projects be run like a real business (while adding some of
Kelly Johnson's basic operating rules).
Age Distribution Among NASA Scientists and Engineers Michael L. Ciancone
This senior system safety engineer for the Space Station Freedom Electric Power System at Lewis Research
Center has been tracking the age gap between oldtimers and newcomers to NASA for several years now. Hav-
ing documented the age disparity, he offers several recommendations to avert a personnel shortfall.
Resources for NASA Managers
Reviews, anecdotes and notices of value and interest.
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The Right Attitude for the Program Manager
by Douglas R. Broome
The NASA experience shows that one can fol-
low all the procedures, rules, suggestions, etc.,
discussed in a management handbook and
still fail to meet program objectives. The prac-
tical fact is that there is no cookbook approach
or procedure -- no specific set of decision rules
that, even if rigorously followed, will en-
sure program success. The elements most
critical to program success are instead found
within the individuals serving as the program
manager or program scientists. Success does
not derive primarily from "what" is done, but
rather by the "how" and "why" in the accom-
plishment. Success, therefore, lies in the indi-
vidual's personal commitment to leadership
and management excellence. It is this com-
mitment that is the key to effectiveness in
these positions.
The question of what characteristics and attri-
butes comprise the excellent manager or lead-
er, regardless of the field of endeavor, evokes
much emotion and endless opinion; it is the
subject of literally hundreds of books. Partici-
pation in this debate is not the purpose here.
Rather, our primary purpose is to present and
briefly discuss the specific characteristics and
attributes that the leadership of the Astro-
physics Division desires in its program man-
agers and program scientists. We should de-
scribe those characteristics and attributes
which, when coupled with the appropriate use
and application of the methodologies, proce-
dures, aids, and suggestions presented in a
handbook, can be expected to maximize the
probability of successful accomplishment of
the objectives of any program that may be as-
signed to them.
At first glance, the following discussion and list
of attributes may seem to imply that the excel-
lent science program manager, flight program
manager, or program scientist must be super-
human. Although outstanding performance is
expected, perfection at all times in all things is
not really achievable. Instead, what is expected
is that degree of perfection necessary at the
time to effectively resolve the issues at hand, as
they are encountered, without the need to re-
sort to excuses.
_ Are You "In" or
_ "Ahead of" the Crowd?
It is an unfortunate fact that many people live
out their lives within a set of limitations or con-
straints of their own creation, constraints that
unnecessarily but seriously limit their accom-
plishments in all aspects of life. In one frame of
reference, they live "... within their own nine
dots;" in another, they "... live lives of quiet des-
peration." Others, meanwhile, seem intuitively
or instinctively to pursue their life goals with a
predisposition towards accomplishment and
achievement that assures their success at al-
most anything they try. These latter people
seem to possess an attitude, sense or psychology
of victory that the former do not. History dem-
onstrates that it is from this latter group that
the most successful leaders derive. And it is
from this latter group that the Astrophysics Di-
vision seeks its science and flight program
managers and program scientists.
Should the reader be considering (or holding) a
position as a science program manager, flight
program manager, or program scientist in this
The Right Attitude for the Program Manager
Division, and after reading this find that he or
she is comfortable with the views presented,
then the working environment will probably
be a friendly, comfortable one. Should the
reader find some major disagreement or lack
of "gut level" comfort with its content, then
his or her talents would probably be better
used elsewhere, and his or her mental peace
and career potential better served in some
other organization.
As a rule, NASA normally has only a handful
of major flight programs under way at any
given time. These few programs, though, in-
volve a significant portion of the agency's re-
sources and comprise the essence of its reason
for existence. The program manager or pro-
gram scientist positions for these programs
are thus coveted. They are positions of high
prestige and high visibility; they are also posi-
tions that demand measures of commitment,
devotion, responsiveness, responsibility, flexi-
bility, courage, leadership, management, and
technical skill well above that demanded of
most other positions in the agency. Finally,
they are positions that involve unusually high
levels of pressure, "heat" and career risk.
Though the pay is excellent for the govern-
ment service, the pay cannot be (and normally
is not) the reason one serves in either of them.
The incumbents must instead derive their pri-
mary personal and career satisfaction from
the successful attainment of difficult goals in
a complex environment by using the best
combinations of people, time, dollars, facili-
ties, and interpersonal relationships.
_ "Trying" Is Not Good Enough
Because of the importance of these flight pro-
grams to NASA's mission, the fundamental
mindset of the successful program manager or
scientist must be on the achievement of excel-
lence, and the most basic personal standard
of performance must be the achievement of
success. Only to have tried must be consid-
ered by the individual to be unacceptable per-
formance. "I tried" cannot be enough for the
success-oriented program manager or pro-
gram scientist. "I sent them a memo," "I
wrote a memo for the record," "I left them a
message"-- this whole approach to satisfac-
tion of their assigned program responsibilities
is inacceptable. Instead, the standard must be
set on real accomplishment m on having
achieved action, met performance, or caused
movement, not in having "tried" to. In this
line of work, points are not given for second
rate or second place performance; there is no
second place in program management -- only
success or failure. The understanding and ac-
ceptance of this fact is the key to management
excellence!
This point -- that "trying," as opposed to suc-
ceeding, is not enough -- is fundamental to
the measurement of success in the Astrophys-
ics Division both in the management of its
flight programs and in the management of its
science programs. If the Astrophysics science
and flight program managers or program sci-
entists accept this and operate accordingly,
then their professional lives will be exhilarat-
ing and rewarding; they will certainly never
be boring. On the other hand, failure in the
ongoing, smaller things is not in itself a major
problem. In fact, failure is one of the better
motivators for "learning that lasts." It is the
making of excuses that is unacceptable, for ex-
cuses are most often simply the lazy person's
rationalizations for not having put out the ex-
tra 10 percent that is often necessary to en-
sure success in any endeavor.
Another major consideration for the prospec-
tive member of an Astrophysics program team
is this: by virtue of the organizational struc-
ture, the science program manager, flight pro-
gram managers, or program scientists in the
Astrophysics Division normally command no
one. Instead, they must convince other peo-
ple to commit the resources of their organiza-
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tions to the accomplishment of their objec-
tives. To achieve this difficult task, the indi-
viduals concerned must exercise great skill in
developing and using effective power; that is,
in acquiring the voluntary alignment of the
goals of the necessary external organizations
and people with those of their programs.
Again, results, not effort, are the basis upon
which performance is measured.
What Part Does "Luck" Play?
One final topic to be considered is "luck."
Coupled with the success-related attributes
discussed below, one must also possess a large
measure of intuitiveness, manifested in what
is often referred to as luck. Many people be-
lieve that luck is a gift from the gods or an act
of nature; others believe that it is a function of
the positions of the stars and planets (seven of
them, anyway) at birth. The management of
this division believes that personal luck is
largely a consequence of behavior; that is,
luck is in essence "made" by the individual
through his or her attitude, beliefs, and life-
style. Regardless of the field of endeavor, the
demonstration of "luck," as with the achieve-
ment of "excellence," seems to lie in the mind-
set of the individual and in what lies in his or
her heart. Its mobilizing force seems there-
fore to originate in the attendant attitude and
fundamental approach to life held by the indi-
vidual. In effect, we are, or become, what we
choose to be.
J The Necessary Attributes
Specific attributes and characteristics that
are desired in the excellent astrophysics sci-
ence program manager, flight program man-
ager, or scientist follow. While only the rarest
of human beings will demonstrate all these at-
tributes at all times, the effective manager or
scientist will exhibit the right ones at the
right times to solve the problems.
The Right Attitude for the Program Manager
1. Sense of duty. Willingness to readily
submerge ego to the greater needs of the pro-
gram, the user community, the agency and
the nation; a person to whom the phrase
"Duty is the most sublime word in the English
language" has real meaning.
2. Personal integrity. Possession of a sys-
tem of ideals and standards consistent with a
personal standard of morality beyond which
one will not go or upon which one will not
compromise; abhorrence of "situational mo-
rality."
3. Maturity of judgment. Wisdom to know
when and when not to speak; to fight; to stand;
to judge; to bend or break the "rules" or regu-
lations; and to follow or violate the estab-
lished chains of command, information flow,
and authority.
4. Moral courage. Ability to determine
when a stand must be taken, without compro-
mise, for the good of the user community, the
program, the agency, and one's personal code
of honor and standard of conduct; ability to set
pride aside and thereby avoid or abandon un-
tenable, unreasonable, or irrational positions
rather than exhibit destructive behavior or
get into positions that conflict with personal
values (see also "Loyalty," below); willingness
to choose the unpopular position when con-
vinced that that position is the "right" one.
5. Mental and (occasionally) physical
courage. Coolness, calmness, steadiness "un-
der fire" or in high-pressure situations.
6. Enthusiasm. Supportive of management
goals and needs, especially for "quick-turn-
around" actions or information transfer; posi-
tive in attitude; antithetical to negativism,
yet maintaining appropriate objectiveness;
antithetical to cynicism; pleasant, especially
under stress.
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7. Loyalty (personal and organizational)
Wisdom to understand the innate personal
and organizational destructiveness of gossip
and disloyalty to one's management chain, su-
pervisor, supervisees, or program objectives,
with an ingrained commitment to avoid or dis-
courage such destructive behavior (see "Moral
courage," above).
8. Quick-wittedness. Ability to respond
quickly and positively to unexpected or rapid-
ly changing situations; "quick on your feet."
9. A "can-do" attitude. Ability to accept or
act on valid management requests for action,
however "far out," strange or unreasonable
they may seem, in a positive, confidence-
inspiring manner, particularly when reaction
or response time is short.
10. Proactive stance. Possession of an in-
herent propensity for self-initiated action; a
self-starter.
11. A "nose for problems." Ability, when
all "appears" well, to sense or "feel" intuitive-
ly that something is amiss (see also the para-
graph above concerning luck and intuition).
12. Global thinking. Ability to consider
events, plans, alternatives, etc., in both the
micro- and macro-view; that is, in planning or
in anticipating future actions or possibilities,
the ability to identify and assess the potential
impacts on the program and initiate the ap-
propriate actions; the ability to develop and
maintain a model of the program's political
operating environment, identifying both the
supportive and the adversarial groups, orga-
nizations or institutions, or potential "stop"
points or scenarios, or national moods, events
or activities that could affect the program
pro or con m and develop appropriate plans or
interventions to either minimize adverse im-
pacts or to exploit favorable opportunities for
the benefit of the program.
13. Unwillingness to accept the status
quo. That is, never accepting out-of-hand
that "this is the only way it can be done" or "it
can't be done."
14. Tenacity. Indefatigability; grit; determi-
nation; stick-to-it-iveness; unwillingness to
accept less than that which will accomplish
the objective; willingness to persevere in the
face of resistance or peer pressure until satis-
fied that the findings, conclusions, and correc-
tive actions proposed or taken are in fact
sound; appreciative of the difference between
"real" action that achieves the desired results,
and "apparent" action, represented by the
writing of useless or ineffective memos or oth-
er such "CYA" documents.
15. Creativity. The ability to create order
out of chaos; to look at a problem in light of
the larger context of what is possible (that is,
outside of the narrow focus of the specific de-
tails of the problem itself) and to develop
unique or non-obvious, straightforward solu-
tions that achieve the supposedly impossible
for the overall good of the program.
16. Innate curiosity/inquisitiveness. An
inherent attitude of '_vVhat's this all about?",
"How does that work?", '_Why do we have to
accept that?", "Is that the only way?", "Is that
really the right solution?", etc.; constantly
looking for problems or alternatives as a nor-
mal way of doing business.
17. Analytical. Through appropriate "pro-
cess" questions, ability to determine whether
the findings, conclusions, and corrective ac-
tions proposed or taken are in fact sound; not
intimidated by the assumed "expertness" of
others, but instead driven to understand the
logic of their recommendations or conclusions.
18. Practical relevancy. The ability to
identify and isolate the "real" problem from
the "apparent" problem; ability to rapidly cut
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through the masses of data to get to the rel-
evant information, to separate the "wheat
from the chaff," to know when to look at the
forest and when to look at the trees; ability to
determine what is important to the solution of
the real problem while maintaining a continu-
ing sensitivity to any implications of this solu-
tion to program and agency objectives and op-
erations.
19. Open-mindedness. Openness and will-
ingness to listen to others; willingness, desire,
and ability to continue learning; one who
finds "not invented here" attitudes unaccepta-
ble.
H0w Do You Measure Up?
The degree to'which existing or prospective-
program managers or program scientists pos-
sess the characteristics and attributes dis-
cussed above cannot, of course, be measured
objectively. Each person must, therefore,
make a rigorously honest, objective self-
assessment in terms of the discussions herein
and answer the question: "For the position I
desire, do I have 'the Right Stuff'?" Be thor-
ough in your self-assessment. Your future
perception of your personal and professional
success, peace of mind, serenity and, in es-
sence, your future happiness are at stake.
Excerpted from "_An Introduction to Astrophysics Division Program Management: A Primer on Program Manage-
ment Practices and Principles Used in the Astrophysics Division, Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA),
NASA" 2nd edition, October 1989. The document was prepared and updated at the request of Dr. C. Pellerin, Di-
rector of the Astrophysics Division.
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Mission success for the Galileo project will not be determined until December of 1995 when the spacecraft ap-
proaches Jupiter. It was launched from Kennedy Space Center in October aboard Space Shuttle Atlantis. Even
then, a probe will have to be released to parachute into the Jovian atmosphere before a two-year study of the planet
and its moons begins.
Program Control for Mission Success
by G. W. Longanecker
Note: The following represents my contribu-
tion to a panel discussion on the subject con-
ducted at the October 4, 1989 session of
NASA's Advanced Project Management
Course. My fellow panel members were Tom
Newman and Bill Sneed.
My first premise is that in order to exercise
program control, you must have a controllable
program. A controllable program is one that
has been properly scoped technically, realisti-
cally scheduled, and adequately budgeted.
The first step in scoping a program is obtain-
ing a set of minimum performance require-
ments to meet the mission objectives. I know
that this is a difficult task, because your cus-
tomer is intent on achieving the maximum
possible performance. However, my recom-
mendation is to get an agreement with your
customer on the minimum requirements, and
then set the specifications to achieve a reason-
ably increased level of performance. This will
allow for possible descoping actions later in
the program, should the need arise. Since our
programs nearly always involve state-of-the-
art technology, and with today's emphasis on
resource control, a good descoping plan devel-
oped early in the program is important to
have in your back pocket.
The other two ingredients of a controllable
program are schedule and cost. The two are
very much interdependent and must be bal-
anced with the degree of risk deemed appro-
priate for the program. There has been a lot of
rhetoric on the subject of risk, especially in re-
cent years. However, in my 30 years with the
agency, I really didn't see much risk-taking,
even with the unmanned scientific and appli-
cations satellite programs. Risk is extremely
difficult to quantify, especially when you're
dealing with single satellite programs. How
do you explain a risk trade-off to a group of
space physicists who are committing possibly
half of their professional careers to a single
satellite mission?
My consummate goal was always mission suc-
cess. What this really boils down to is that
you need to have adequate schedule slack and
budget contingency to solve the inevitable
problems that will confront you along the
way. Headquarters must hold sufficient re-
serves to cover any changes in scope. This is
important enough to reiterate. The project
manager at the field Center budgets and con-
trols reserves for problem solving; the pro-
gram manager at Headquarters budgets and
controls reserves for scope changes. The last
line of defense is to descope the program. As I
said earlier, if you have set your specifications
with some margin over the minimum goals,
you should have some room to descope and
still meet mission objectives. The real chal-
lenge for a manager is that you probably will
have to make some descoping decisions during
the development phase so that you have some
remaining contingency for the test and evalu-
ation phase, mission operations, data collec-
tion, and data processing.
Properly scoping a program requires that suf-
ficient studies be performed during the defini-
tion phase. As a rule of thumb, four to eight
percent of the expected total run-out cost of a
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program should be spent through phase B. In
my experience, NASA is notorious for skimp-
ing on definition-phase funding. When you
skimp during phase A and phase B, you have
an open invitation to performance, schedule,
and budget problems during phases C and D.
As part of the procurement planning process,
you will develop in-house a "should-cost" esti-
mate for the program. Your budget requests
will be based on this "should-cost" figure plus
contingency. Because of competition, you will
most likely negotiate a contract for less than
the "should-cost" estimate. The difference
should not be considered part of your contin-
gency for problem solving, but rather it repre-
sents the additional funds required to realis-
tically perform the prescribed effort without
problems. Occasionally a contractor will pro-
pose a scheme that should save some money,
but again my experience has been that you
should pay attention to your "should-cost" es-
timate.
Beyond the programmatic obstacles to a con-
trollable program, the single biggest hard-
ware obstacle in my experience has been
piece parts. I can't remember a single pro-
gram (and I've launched 21 satellites) where
we didn't have problems with piece parts.
We'd design a circuit, breadboard it, test it
and then find that we couldn't get flight-
qualified versions of the parts. We also suf-
fered from being a small-volume user of piece
parts since most of our programs involved a
single satellite. The only advice I can offer is
to use standard parts as much as possible in
your designs, order your parts as early as pos-
sible in the program, and look for second-
source suppliers for your critical parts. Even
after doing all of the above, the odds are that
you will have piece part delivery problems.
As for program control, there are many good
techniques and tools. Everything starts with
a good work breakdown structure (WBS).
You will have developed one during the deft-
nition phase and for the phase C and D pro-
curement package and, subsequent to contract
award, will agree to the WBS with your prime
contractor. The WBS is the basis for your
schedule projection and budget estimate. It
must have sufficient granularity to identify
the critical elements or building blocks of the
program.
Your schedule must have slack identified at
critical points in the program. It is not suffi-
cient to carry all the slack in the period just
before the launch readiness date. This is espe-
cially true when you're dealing with intergov-
ernmental or international partners in a coop-
erative program. In most cases you'll find
that the cooperating agencies have even less
flexibility to deal with schedule and budget
changes than we do in NASA. Once estab-
lished, the schedules can be tracked by any
number of computer-generated systems.
Critical paths are easily identified and
tracked. However, I advise you not to rely
solely on the automated schedule systems.
I've always found it useful to prepare a few
charts on critical elements that I could update
manually to look for schedule trends. My fa-
vorite is one that tracked on a monthly basis,
for a few selected milestones, the currently
planned date versus the originally scheduled
date (Figure 1). I would frequently find that I
could apply the slope of the trend for interme-
diate milestones to forecast the most probable
completion date for a downstream event, even
though the contractor continued to forecast
the original event date. I found it easier to
look at my few graphs than to study the
computer-generated charts covering the walls
of the "war room." You have to keep a per-
spective on the big picture.
The final element of program control that I
wish to discuss is a performance measurement
system (PMS). A PMS, or earned value sys-
tem, allows you to track progress versus ex-
pended resources compared to your plan. Es-
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sentially all major contractors have a PMS
that they use for their programs. The key
word here is "use." Having a PMS in your
contract is a useless exercise if the contractor
is not actually using the system to help man-
age the program. Accordingly, you should
adopt the system your contractor is familiar
with, rather than insist on a similar but dif-
ferent system. Due to the nature of our busi-
ness, changes to the program baseline are to
be expected. Obviously, such changes should
be kept to the absolute minimum, but when
it's unavoidable, any significant change must
be quickly incorporated into the PMS.
Reporting earned value against an outdated
plan is useless at best. It can be worse than
useless if someone believes data that is blind-
ly cranked out, based on an outdated plan. If
the data is current, a PMS can help you de-
tect the trouble spots sooner and, therefore,
direct your problem-solving energies more
efficiently.
As is the case with automated scheduling
systems, PMS is not a panacea for the man-
agers. You have to keep track of the big pic-
ture, and above all, use good old common
sense.
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GOES-G, launched on a Delta 178 in 1986, was built for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
The satellite is an improved version of geostationary meteorological spacecraft providing day and night pictures,
plus vertical temperature and moisture data in the atmosphere for weather forecasting. Current GOES projects
have PMS requirements that are tested and refi ned for better program control.
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Performance Measurement: A Tool for Program Control
by Nancy Abell
The NASA program and project managers of
the 1990s will continue to work in the envi-
ronment of constrained resources in terms of
reduced budgets, limited staffing, and tight
schedules. In a speech to the Explorers Club
in January 1989, former NASA Administra-
tor James Fletcher stated: "The funds being
requested do not permit us the luxury of back-
ups, of alternatives, of programmatic robust-
ness. Virtually every element of the program
is being pursued on a success schedule -- and
we know in advance that there will be unfore-
seen technical problems to solve and dilem-
mas to face which will require internal adjust-
ments and constraints." In this environment
there are focused efforts to improve program
and project management. One potentially
powerful tool available to the project manager
which has been used successfully in many
government agencies is performance mea-
surement.
Performance measurement is a management
tool for planning, monitoring, and controlling
all aspects of program and project manage-
ment- cost, schedule, and technical require-
ments. It is a means (concept and approach) to
a desired end (effective program planning and
control). To reach the desired end, however,
performance measurement must be applied
and used appropriately, with full knowledge
and recognition of its power and of its limita-
tions- what it can and cannot do for the
project manager.
Performance measurement is not a new con-
cept to the government or to the aerospace in-
dustry. It has its origins in the Department of
Defense (DoD) programs of the 1960s. Inter-
est and application of the performance mea-
surement concept spread to other government
agencies in the 1970s and 1980s. Today per-
formance measurement is being applied to
major programs of the DoD, National Security
Agency, Department of Energy, Federal Avi-
ation Administration, and NASA. Perfor-
mance measurement is widely endorsed as a
valid approach to controlling contract perfor-
mance.
The Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has
been implementing performance measure-
ment system (PMS) requirements since 1983
on major research and development (R&D)
contracts with a price of $25 million or more
and a period of performance longer than one
year. GSFC's PMS policy was established by
the Center director to provide for consistent
application on all major Center acquisitions.
Use of performance measurement is also en-
couraged on R&D contracts in the $10-25 mil-
lion range, but applied on a case-by-case basis.
GSFC currently has 12 contracts in various
project phases that have PMS requirements.
With the large number of major independent
spacecraft and instrument development con-
tracts at GSFC, such as the various meteoro-
logical spacecraft and instruments of the
Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellite and Television and Infrared Obser-
vational Satellite programs, we have had the
opportunity to continually improve our imple-
mentation of PMS through a "lessons learned"
approach. Many project managers have had
the opportunity to test the effectiveness of this
management tool. At GSFC, some of the more
effective PMS applications have been on the
Gamma Ray Observatory and the Tracking
11
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Figure 1. - Traditional Plan vs. Actual Technique
and Data Relay Satellite System spacecraft
contracts.
What is the potential of this management
tool? What does performance measurement
do that a traditional plan vs. actual technique
cannot do? Performance measurement pro-
vides an improvement over the customary
comparison of how much money was spent (ac-
tual cost) vs. how much was planned to be
spent based on a schedule of activities (work
planned). This commonly used plan vs. actual
comparison, however, does not allow one to
know from the numerical data if the actual
cost incurred was for work intended to be
done. With performance measurement, actual
work progress (work done, also known as
earned value) is quantified by an objective
measure of how much work has been accom-
plished on the program. This added dimen-
sion of a quantitative assessment of work ac-
complished allows for comparisons to be made
between the value of work that was done vs.
the work that was planned to be done (sched-
ule variance). It also allows for a comparison
of the actual cost of work that was done vs. the
planned value of the work that was done (cost
variance). This analysis then provides for ear-
ly identification and quantification of cost and
schedule problems.
A graphic depiction of the data available from
the traditional plan vs. actual technique com-
pared to those available from a performance
measurement system may serve to more clear-
ly illustrate the concept. A hypothetical
spacecraft program is expected to take five
years to build at a cost of $500 million. Figure
1 shows the traditional plan vs. actual tech-
nique. If"time now" is the completion of year
2, the graph indicates that we had planned to
spend $250 million. The actual cost (i.e., time
card charges, material expenses, etc.) reported
to the government is $200 million.
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Figure 2. - Performance Measurement Technique
What can a project manager conclude from
this information? Is it possible to determine if
this program is overrunning or underrun-
ning? With this limited information avail-
able, a project manager may assume that the
contract is underrunning and would have no
basis to question the assumption that this pro-
gram will underrun at completion. At a mini-
mum it currently appears that the $500 mil-
lion funding estimate is adquate to complete
this effort.
In Figure 2 an additional data point has been
added to the same hypothetical spacecraft pro-
gram. The contractor has assessed the value
of the work accomplished (or earned value) to
date. This new information reveals that of the
$250 million of work planned to be done to
date, only $150 million has been done. Some
work that was planned to be done has not been
done and is reflected as a $100 million sched-
uled variance. Also the $150 million worth of
work done can be compared with the actual
cost of $200 million. This comparison shows
the planned value of the work vs. the actual
cost of that same piece of work. Now the pro-
ject manager can see that this program is ac-
tually overrunning by $50 million to date. We
now have enough data to question the validity
of the $500 million funding estimate for com-
pletion of this effort. We can begin to see that
this program is headed for an overrun of costs
at completion along with potential schedule
slippage.
As a result, the project manager having the
PMS data available in Figure 2 is better able
to estimate early the total costs and projected
period of performance of this program, there-
fore avoiding being surprised by an overrun
much later in the program. If the data yield a
"doom and gloom" assessment, there is oppor-
tunity to make decisions early to avoid an ap-
proach that is too costly or that takes too long.
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The basic objective of performance measure-
ment systems is to provide a suitable basis for
responsible decision-making by both the con-
tractor and the government management by
ensuring that (1) the contractor is using effec-
tive internal cost and schedule management
control systems and that (2) the government
can rely on valid, timely, and auditable data
to be produced by those systems to determine
program status.
Unfortunately there has not been a consistent
experience within the agency regarding PMS
implementation. Personnel at various NASA
Centers and in the aerospace industry believe
that while some NASA applications of PMS
have been successful and effective, other at-
tempts to use PMS as a management tool have
actually been counterproductive. In some in-
stances, performance measurement systems
have not always provided accurate reporting
of cost and schedule status, and there are dif-
fering opinions about why PMS did not work
in these instances. The most prevalent of
these is that in the NASA environment and
culture, a disciplined approach to program
management is not appropriate or applicable.
While it is healthy to question the worth and
applicability of PMS for NASA programs, it is
also beneficial to explore some of the common-
sense features of PMS that have proven effec-
tire in controlling project costs and schedules
in many government agencies for the past 22
years.
._ Some Basic Principles
Performance measurement can work for you if
you apply some basic principles.
1. Plan the entire contractual effort. It is
essential to plan the work for the entire period
of performance. Near-term work is planned in
detail while future work can be planned at a
summary level. Failure to recognize all of the
work to be done makes it impossible to prop-
erly allocate resources. Programs could con-
sume too many of the resources on the near-
term work and not leave enough to do the
work downstream.
2. Maintain baseline integrity. The mea-
surement of actual conditions against a disci-
plined or controlled plan reveals performance
trends that can help to predict future condi-
tions and to determine a future course of ac-
tion.
3. Determine accomplishment at the level
at which the work is performed. Who can
better assess the work that has been done and
the work remaining to be done than the man-
ager responsible for performing the work?
4. Measure accomplishment objectively.
The most valuable status assessment of a
piece of work is based on pre-defined miles-
tones as opposed to personal feelings and prej-
udices lacking reality or substance.
5. Summarize for higher levels of man-
agement. While accomplishment is assessed
at a relatively low level, summary reporting
to higher levels of management, where re-
sources are made available, is also essential
for control.
6. Analyze variances and forecast im-
pact. Variances are simply indications that
actual conditions are different from the origi-
nal assumptions, and variances may indicate
the existence of current or potential problems.
Analysis of the variances allows management
to correct problems or to redirect efforts to
avoid potential problems, as well as to project
cost at completion.
In summary, the concept of performance mea-
surement is good, common sense program
management that NASA project managers
have always practiced, but perhaps not in a
formal way.
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_ Specifying Customer Requirements
NASA authority for performance measure-
ment is based on the agency requirement
specified in NASA Management Instruction
9501.1 "NASA Contractor Financial Manage-
ment Reporting System" and NASA Hand-
book 9501.2B Procedures for Contractor Re-
porting of Correlated Cost and Performance
Data. The NASA Form 533P (where "P" re-
presents performance) has been used by con-
tractors to report performance data to NASA,
unless the contractor has another format that
serves as the equivalent. The 533P is essen-
tially a minimum NASA requirement for data
reporting purposes only. It does not require
that an identif/able system or set of subsys-
tems support the data. As the contractors are
free to generate data in any way they desire,
there is the high potential for invalid or mis-
leading data if this is the only requirement
placed on a contractor related to performance
measurement. Without a system requirement
for visibility and control of the baseline, for
objectivity in measuring accomplishment, or
for discipline in forecasting estimates to com-
pletion, then performance measurement may
not yield valuable information. While data
can be reported on a 533P, a more disciplined
approach to the management system is need-
ed to identify some rules for performance mea-
surement systems. These rules are known
within the government and aerospace indus-
try as the "criteria."
The performance measurement criteria do not
identify a specific management control system
to be applied to a program; but rather, they re-
present a set of standards against which to
measure the acceptability of a contractor's
cost and schedule control system. There is, in
fact, a variety of equally effective ways for
contractors to meet the criteria requirements.
The criteria allow a company to organize in
any way that suits the company's philosophy
and style. The criteria also allow a company
to develop any desired policies, procedures, or
,rrrPrfwrrrrfrrrwrrrrrrrfrrrPFrr,rrrPrriFr_L[..t_rrPrfrrTrPwrrrrrrF_l
methods that meet the requirements. The cri-
teria address the age-old questions of any pro-
ject manger: What work is to be done? Who
will do it? When is it going to be done? How
much will it cost? Where is the program
heading? What has changed? The contractors
address these questions through their man-
agement systems' integrated set of subsys-
tems. These are subsystems that would be re-
quired to manage a program whether or not a
performance measurement requirement was
imposed. Performance measurement criteria
simply require that a more disciplined ap-
proach be applied to each subsystem. The
PMS subsystems are (1) work authorization,
(2) budgeting, (3) scheduling, (4) data accumu-
lation, (5) variance analysis and estimate at
completion, (6) subcontract and material con-
trol and accountability, (7) indirect expense
management, and (8) change baseline control.
PMS, then, does not address just the account-
ing system, but rather it addresses the inte-
grated set of subsystems that constitute all
elements of program planning and control.
_A Management SystemGood
The key to the power of performance measure-
ment is that performance measurement data
are only as valid as the management system
that provides them. If a contractor operates a
sound internal management system, the cus-
tomer should be able to extract summary data
from that system that reflect project status.
To have a valid management system applied
to NASA work in contractor plants, several
conditions need to be met.
First, a management commitment from the
top down is required -- all levels of manage-
ment support are essential. It is not enough to
have project financial or resources support
personnel discussing PMS with the contrac-
tor. The involvement of technical personnel is
critical. PMS involves all aspects of program
management and needs to he viewed in this
way by NASA project and functional manage-
ment personnel to be effective.
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Second, management system discipline must
be stressed and required. While it may be de-
sirable to maintain a spirit of cooperation and
non-adversarial relations with our contrac-
tors, PMS is not of any value without a disci-
plined approach to management. Without a
requirement for the contractor to maintain a
baseline, to apply objective techniques for per-
formance measurement, or to reliably forecast
the cost to completion, there can be no confi-
dence in the value of the data that the man-
agement system generates and that the con-
tractor reports to NASA on a monthly basis.
Third, use of data generated by the PMS is
essential. A few simple mathematical formu-
las and computations yield very revealing in-
formation about the project status and poten-
tial future of the program. Use of data serves
to facilitate communications internally and
between NASA and the contractor.
Fourth, corrective action needs to be taken
when problems are identified. A management
system supplies data points, not solutions. It
provides visibility into cost, schedule, and
technical status. A system, however, does not
manage the project, people do. A system can-
not eliminate schedule slippages or stop over-
runs, but it can help the project manager to
understand the potential impact if trends are
allowed to continue without mid-course cor-
rection.
Fifth, an in-plant review of the contractor's
management system applied to your program
and conducted by a NASA team of interested
and knowledgeable technical and resources
personnel is critical. The NASA personnel
gain invaluable knowledge of the policies,
methods, and procedures used by the contrac-
tor to generate monthly status reports. By un-
derstanding the source of the data, we can
calibrate the validity of our monthly customer
reports and require the contractor to revise
procedures that do not produce valid data.
PMS is not intended to replace traditional
management tools m it should enhance them.
Day-to-day program management is essential.
In fact, if managers are relying solely on per-
formance measurement data generated at
month-end, they will be learning of problem
situations much too late to be effective. Peri-
odic status reviews, "kicking the tires," and
routine communication internal to the con-
tractor and between the contractor and gov-
ernment managers are critical in managing a
program. PMS may identify a new problem;
but, in most cases, it allows quantification of a
known problem through all elements of the
work breakdown structure and through the
functional organizations to provide a basis for
improved management decisions.
_::_:_ Cost Effectiveness
In times of constrained resources it is reason-
able for managers to question the cost effec-
tiveness of PMS. What are the benefits and
associated costs? The question is difficult to
answer, however, since both the benefits and
costs are nearly impossible to quantify.
PMS results in a better controlled project with
improved communication, both internally and
with the customer. To quantify the benefits is
to ask, 'What is the value of good manage-
ment?" It is not evident how a cost savings (or
cost avoidance), a shortened schedule, or im-
proved technical performance through correc-
tive action can be clearly associated with re-
sults or a specific cost.
The costs of PMS have also defied quantifica-
tion for 22 years. The PMS-unique costs on
the total contract cannot be separately identi-
fied from the management costs that would be
incurred in any case. They are not routinely
collected by contractors, nor is it considered
practical to do so. This was illustrated in a
1987 survey of GSFC contractors who had im-
plemented a PMS requirement. In the survey,
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some contractors suggested that the costs of
PMS beyond the usual management costs may
be expressed as a percentage ranging from 2
percent to 6 percent of total contract costs. In
each case, however, the contractor could not
substantiate the percentage. It was someone's
"non-scientific estimate," as stated by one con-
tractor. Surveys conducted by the DoD show
that there is no correlation between the cost of
PMS and the contract costs.
This is not to say that there cannot be cost as-
sociated with PMS requirements. In fact, the
cost of implementing PMS is in direct propor-
tion to the quality of the existing manage-
ment system. The poorer the state of the con-
tractor's system, the greater the need for im-
provement and the more it will cost to im-
prove. Contractors who maintain discipline in
their systems would incur very low cost for
implementing PMS on subsequent contracts.
If the same contractors did not maintain their
systems, over time the cost to implement PMS
on future contracts would be greater as the
need for improvement becomes greater. Fur-
ther, if there is not an existing integrated cost
and schedule management system, the con-
tractor will certainly incur cost to develop one.
GSFC experience, however, has been that con-
tractors awarded major development procure-
ments that contain PMS requirements are
contractors who already have operational
PMS systems as a result of their dealings with
the DoD. Costs of PMS have been minimal
compared to the significantly greater value
added.
There is one additional factor to consider in a
discussion of the costs of PMS. Typical points
of contention between the government and in-
dustry concerning PMS implementation in-
clude the levels of detail identified for man-
agement and reporting, and the variance ana-
lysis thresholds identified for customer report-
ing. It is possible to avoid incurring unneces-
sary cost to the government and frustration
for the contractor by not requesting reports-
that no one reads or uses, or "nice to have"
items or analyses.
In summary, with the focus on efforts to im-
prove program and project management,
PMS is a potentially valuable tool. Like any
tool, however, it is only as valuable as the user
chooses to make it. Implemented properly,
PMS can ensure the generation of valid cost
and schedule performance data to ease the
manager's decision-making process and can
result in more effective program planning and
control.
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Galileo and its Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) were installed in Atlantis'payload bay at the end of August 1989. Six
hours after launch the IUS was ignited, sending Galileo in a planetary trajectory past Venus once and Earth twice
before swinging out to explore Jupiter, the Solar System's largest planet. SMR&QA engineers had to identify and
analyze potential hazards related to the spacecraft's nuclear power source.
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Managing SRM & QA Throughout
the Project Life Cycle
by George A. Rodney
Program and project managers often ask me
how they can gain maximum benefit from
their safety, reliability, maintainability, and
quality assurance (SRM&QA) engineering
and technical support. My answer is that it is
vital to develop a "team" culture within the
program or project that includes SRM&QA
support. Managers stand to benefit most
when their management procedures and tech-
niques are designed to ensure that safety, reli-
ability, maintainability, and quality are built
into the design plans of products and services
up-front. They benefit least when safety, reli-
ability, maintainability, and quality have to
be built into the products and services at a
later date, with the associated high costs of in-
spection and rework as well as the consequent
impact on schedule and budget. You cannot
"inspect" quality in.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the
role of NASA's SRM&QA capability as a valu-
able resource to assist program and project
managers in managing risk throughout the
life cycle of their programs and projects and to
show the importance of utilizing SRM&QA re-
sources and total quality management (TQM)
principles to achieve excellence. The princi-
ples embodied in the philosophy of TQM range
from proper planning to total involvement of
the workforce to assure quality products and
services. Therefore, it is important to under-
stand more fully the benefits that SRM&QA
support has to offer. TQM principles include
the following :
$ Creating a "team" culture characterized
by quality, innovation, goal-setting, two-
way communication, and participation;
• Ensuring top management leadership and
involvement in quality;
• Focusing on the customer and customer re-
quirements;
• Pursuing continuous improvement; and
• Working towards prevention instead of cor-
rection.
The underlying theme of my discussion is that,
because application of TQM principles encour-
ages appropriate consideration of all factors (in-
cluding SRM&QA-related ones), the end prod-
uct or service will have safety, reliability,
maintainability, and quality designed in, there-
by reducing rework. The consequent impact on
cost and schedule will show that SRM&QA can
help conserve budget and time resources while
ensuring safer mission performance.
I SRM&QA Support at Agency, Center,
and Project Levels
SRM&QA expertise spans a wide range of
knowledge, skills, and experience available to
the project manager throughout the life cycle.
SRM&QA engineering and technical personnel
at three levels assist project managers endeav-
oring to address risk management issues dur-
ing the design, development, implementation,
and evaluation phases of their projects.
At the agency level, the Office of SRM&QA at
NASA Headquarters is responsible for develop-
ing and implementing firmly defined agency-
wide SRM&QA policies. These policies, found
in a variety of NASA Management Instruc-
19
Managing SRM & QA Throughout the Project Life Cycle
[]u_LLL_L_LL L L L L L LLL L L L J, k L • L [J_LL • LLL L • • L • • t L LLL LL LL • L • L LL • L LL L L L L LLLL LL L LL • L L L t L_LLLL),LLJ. LLLLLLLLLLLLLL L •/. • • • • LL • L • L L L • LL L • I. L L L L L LL L L L LL L LI
tions (NMIs) and NASA Handbooks (NHBs),
provide a foundation for project efforts to ad-
dress risk. The Office of SRM&QA also
tracks and analyzes trends and provides inde-
pendent assessments of major programs. Fi-
nally, as NASA's safety and mission assur-
ance advocate, the office acts on behalf of pro-
ject managers in helping secure resources and
scheduling that promotes safety and mission
assurance.
At the Center level, each Center's SRM&QA
organization develops and implements its
SRM&QA policies. It performs trend track-
ing and analysis and provides independent
assessments of programs and projects in a
manner similar to the Office of SRM&QA at
Headquarters. Also, the Center SRM&QA or-
ganization provides project managers with
the engineering and technical support to per-
form the required SRM&QA design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation functions.
At the project level, SRM&QA personnel use
a variety of tools and techniques, within the
framework of agency and Center SRM&QA
policies, to assess risk.
_ SRM&QA Tools and Techniques
Managers should become familiar with the
tools and techniques that their SRM&QA
support personnel use to assist them in de-
signing and implementing product or service
plans. Information concerning these tools
and techniques can be gained from discus-
sions with the supporting SRM&QA person-
nel and by being familiar with the require-
ments set out by the NHB 5300.4 series and
other applicable agency and Center
SRM&QA directives. The tools and tech-
niques described in the following paragraphs
are some of the principal ones with which
managers should be familiar.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA). A FMEA is a systematic analysis
performed on each component of a system to
identify those components that are critical to
the performance and safety of the crew, vehi-
cle, or mission. The analysis includes identi-
fying all system components, determining the
potential modes of failure for each compo-
nent, and recommending corrective actions.
Critical Items List (CIL). Based on a FMEA,
a CIL is developed, consisting of a summary of
single critical failure points and a summary of
redundant elements, the failure of which
could cause loss of crew, vehicle, or mission.
As such, the CIL contains the same informa-
tion as the FMEA, except that it includes the
rationale justifying retention for redundancy
of any critical item not meeting design specifi-
cations.
Hazard Analysis (HA). HAs are performed
after the FMEA/CIL and are designed to iden-
tify, analyze, and categorize safety hazards,
and subsequently track them to closure or res-
olution. Closure or resolution includes elimi-
nation of the hazard or control of the hazard
through development of acceptable safety
measures.
Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
(PRACA). PRACA is a system for reporting
all problems (failures and unsatisfactory con-
dition reports) and establishing the necessary
corrective action.
Electrical, Electronic, and Electrome-
chanical (EEE) Parts and Mechanical
Parts Control. These parts control systems
are designed to control the selection, reduc-
tion in number of types, specification, failure
analysis, stocking and handling methods, in-
stallation procedures, and reliability require-
ments of EEE and mechanical parts.
Qualitative Risk Assessment (QRA). QRA
is a nonmathematical review of all factors af-
fecting the safety of a system (hardware, soft-
ware, etc.). It examines actual designs, pro-
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cesses, and parameters against a predeter-
mined set of risk acceptability parameters.
Probabilistic (or Quantitative) Risk As-
sessment (PRA). PRA, a more rigorous engi-
neering review than QRA, generates numeri-
cal probabilities of risk by considering reli-
ability and probability estimates of risk occur-
rence.
Risk assessment, whether qualitative risk
categorization or quantitative risk estima-
tion, must be followed by the evaluation of
risk significance. It is important to note that
numbers per se are not the most important re-
sult from risk assessment. In fact, numbers
can sometimes be deceiving. Program and
project managers must keep in mind that, in
reviewing risk assessment results, the most
important result is an increased understand-
ing of the system that leads to the discovery of
ways to fix weak spots. Efforts can then be
aimed at eliminating hazards where possible
through redesign or through controlling ha-
zards, by developing acceptable safety mea-
sures, in those cases where elimination is not
possible.
!_ Cost, Schedule, Performance,and Risk Management
Sound decision-making for program and pro-
ject managers requires assessing each deci-
sion's impact in three areas: cost, schedule,
and performance. Managers face immense
pressure to keep cost within budget, schedule
according to plan, and performance according
to assigned mission objectives. Therefore,
much of their time is spent reconciling the
three. Since there is an element of risk to bud-
get, schedule, or performance associated with
every decision or non-decision, managing risk
is a primary component of this process.
Risk, as it relates to performance, is defined a_s
exposure to the chance of loss or injury to per-
sonnel, loss or damage to equipment, or loss or
delay to the mission. It is a function of the fol-
lowing three factors:
• The frequency with which a hazard oc-
curs;
• The potential severity of the resulting
consequences; and
• The probability of those consequences oc-
curring when the hazardous situation ex-
ists.
We at NASA have learned all too well that
performance failure can mean more than just
failure to accomplish a mission objective. It
can mean tragic loss of personnel and equip-
ment, sometimes with long-term conse-
quences to cost and schedule.
Risk management is the decision-making pro-
cess concerned with the balancing of
performance-related risk with cost, schedule,
and other programmatic considerations. It
consists of the following four steps:
• Identifying risk;
• Assessing risk;
• Making decisions regarding the
disposition of risk; and
• Tracking the effectiveness of the
decisions made.
Safety is defined as the measure of freedom
from occurrence or risk of loss or injury during
use of a system or equipment through the
elimination or control of hazards or the reduc-
tion of risk to an acceptable level. For exam-
ple, SRM&QA engineers for the Galileo pro-
gram had to identify and analyze the potential
hazards related to the vehicle's nuclear power
source. These analyses helped planners to
eliminate some hazards and develop measures
to control others. The effectiveness of these
controls is continuously tracked and evaluat-
ed and change recommendations are devel-
oped, as required.
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Reliability is the measure of assurance that a
system or equipment will perform as designed
by reducing risks of failure. As the life cycle
for NASA programs and projects lengthens,
increasing emphasis will be placed on the in-
creasing reliability of systems as a method of
eliminating or controlling hazards. High reli-
ability in the Apollo and Voyager programs
contributed to their success.
Maintainability is the measure of ease and ra-
pidity with which a system or equipment can
be restored to operational status following a
failure or be maintained as a preventive mea-
sure prior to failure. Increased maintainabil-
ity contributes to managing risk since it helps
compensate for reliability shortcomings in
current technology. Space Station Freedom,
with an expected life of 30 years, will require
systems with an increased degree of maintain-
ability since the space station cannot return to
Earth for repair. SRM&QA support can assist
by performing integrated logistics support
and configuration management studies.
Quality assurance is the measure of assurance
that a system or equipment is produced or im-
plemented as designed or intended through
design review, inspection, and evaluation.
High reliability systems are useless if they
are not produced to high quality standards.
For example, the quality of fasteners is be-
coming an important quality issue of interna-
tional proportions. Also, new nondestructive
evaluation technology is assisting managers
in ensuring the quality fabrication of hard-
ware.
*_ Conclusion--SRM&QA Contributes= to Good Management
The principles of TQM provide the foundation
for decisions. Successful managers have
learned the importance of continuous ira-
provement in providing products and services
and are designing in quality to achieve excel-
lence. Less successful ones risk dooming their
program or project to struggling to "inspect
quality in" and reworking problems in their
products and services that could have been re-
solved during the design process.
From my standpoint, risk management is a
decision-making process when the manager
balances performance-related risk with cost,
schedule, and other programmatic consider-
ations. Stated this way, performance should
receive somewhat greater consideration in
the decision-making process than do cost and
schedule, at least to the extent that acceptable
safety and mission assurance standards are
met. While no one wants to make decisions
that have a negative impact on cost and sched-
ule, cost and schedule decisions cannot result
in the kind of loss, in terms of resources and
equipment, that performance failures can.
Performance objectives and mission success
must come first, as they did in past programs
such as Apollo, Voyager, and Viking.
SRM&QA expertise is a critical element of the
project team's ability to develop solutions to
eliminate or control risk, attaining continued
objectives and mission successes within bud-
get, on time, and according to specifications.
Quality is planned in, designed in, and built in. Quality is not inspected in. Quality starts before designs are drawn
and well before metal is bent. The main message here is that each person and organization in the program must un-
derstand and believe in the need for quality performance from the onset of the program. You cannot wait until the
hardware is built to decide you want quality and then attempt to "inspect" it in. I have often seen this tried, but never
successfully or economically. Quality encompasses more than just the delivered hardware. It includes management,
requirements, design, development, testing and documentation.. Simply stated, the quality of every person's output
is very important to the outcome of the program. --James B. Odom, "Guiding Principles for the Space Station Pro-
gram," in Issues in NASA Program and Pro]ect Management, NASA SP-6101 (1988).
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Advantages of Cost Plus Award Fee Contracts
by William C. Keathley
Personal experiences in the management of
projects and shared experiences with col-
leagues have convinced me that a Cost Plus
Award Fee contract is the best procurement
vehicle for the high-tech, one-of-a-kind, devel-
opment projects that constitute most of
NASA's projects.
But, like most things, success isn't automatic.
It takes work to make it happen, and the suc-
cessful implementation of award fee contracts
is no exception. In fact, the use of this type of
contract requires more government and con-
tractor effort than other forms of contracts.
But, in my opinion, it's worth every hour
spent.
Over the years, I've collected a list of "lessons
learned" related to the use of award fee con-
tracts. I'll try to articulate those lessons ade-
quately in the following text. Keep in mind
that I'm not speaking from the standpoint of a
procurement officer. My observations come
from the day-to-day use of these contracts in
various positions I've held -- project manager,
director of flight projects (project manager's
supervisor), and fee determination official.
An award fee contract is described as an ar-
rangement whereby the government periodi-
cally awards a fee consistent with the cost,
schedule, and technical performance achieved
by a contractor during a preset period with
preset award fee pools.
_ Rationale
Let me explain why I like award fee contract-
ing. First, it's the only contracting method
where both government and contractor goals
are closely linked. The government wants
cost, schedule, and technical performance; the
contractor wants profits. The better the total
performance, the better the fees (profits) will
be. Compare that with a fixed price contract
where the total price (cost plus fee) is fixed. If
the cost of a fixed price effort is underestimat-
ed, the contractor may sometimes make ad-
ustments that impose risks to the technical
performance. This protects the contractor's
profits but imposes risk on the government's
goal for technical performance. Other ways
exist for contractors to protect their fees in a
fixed price arrangement (all of them bad for
the government), but that subject deserves a
separate paper.
Second, an award fee contract has a built-in
mechanism to conveniently alter and empha-
size program events in order to satisfy current
external and internal situations -- and the
government is involved in these adjustments.
Prior to each award fee period, the govern-
ment and contractor project managers review
the plan for the upcoming period, agree on the
planned events, and place the appropriate em-
phasis on each event. Should problems arise
(and they always do), the plan and the fee em-
phasis can be adjusted accordingly. This is
considered by most project managers to be the
most important feature of award fee contracts.
And while I'm on adjustments, I'd like to men-
tion the use of "rollovers," in which lost fee
from prior periods is used to "sweeten the pot"
on future events that have become so critical
that additional emphasis is warranted. Roll-
over is a powerful award fee tool to motivate
contractors if used properly.
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Third, the award fee process demands good
communication between the government and
contractor participants. And every project
manager knows -- or should know -- that
good communication is a necessary ingredi-
ent of every successful project. The meetings
required by award fee contracting reinforce
the need for clear communication.
Fourth, it has been my experience that con-
tractor performance on award fee contracts is
superior to performance by the same contrac-
tors on other types of contracts. The quality
of the product is certainly superior. The fee
earned by those contractors is better than
they could have received on other cost type
contracts, and it should be. Remember: bet-
ter performance, which the government
wants, results in higher fees, which the con-
tractor wants. I don't have any data on fixed
price contracts because there is no govern-
ment knowledge of final costs of those types of
contracts. But I'll bet award fees are close to
the profits customarily realized by contrac-
tors, even on fixed price development con-
tracts.
The downside to award fee contracting is the
additional contractor and government per-
sonnel required to implement award fee con-
tracts. It is certainly true that more people
are needed to formally assess contractor per-
formance, conduct performance evaluation
board meetings, and report findings to the fee
determination official. But I maintain that
most of that work should be done under any
circumstances, and the improved communica-
tion is worth the effort. So I'm not sympa-
thetic to those complaints.
_ Implementation
All the good features discussed above can go
down the drain with faulty implementation.
I've found the following nine ground rules to
be effective in properly implementing the
award fee contracts in which I've been in-
volved. I will readily admit that there should
be many ways to skin this cat, but frankly,
I've found no effective alternatives to the fol-
lowing rules. I've also seen instances where
both the government and the contractor
failed to reach their objectives as a direct re-
sult of deviations from one or more of the fol-
lowing rules.
First, the government project manager
must chair the Performance Evaluation
Board (PEB). After all, the project manager
is the key official selected by NASA to be re-
sponsible for the project cost, schedule, and
technical performance. The project manager
is therefore in the best position to evaluate
and judge the importance of the performance
during the project evolution and obviously
has the most to gain or lose from that perfor-
mance or lack thereof. If that's not true, the
agency should find another project manager.
On the other hand, it's crucial that the con-
tractor understand that the government pro-
ject manager is the most influential govern-
ment individual for all project activities, and
looking elsewhere for project-level influence
is unproductive.
Second, the PEB should consist of institu-
tional members who are participating in
the project: procurement, business (pro-
gram control in some Centers), engineering,
and product assurance (quality control and
safety at some Centers). Depending on the
end item or service, science and operations
should also be added. It's advisable to keep
the PEB membership as small as possible,
and it's important to select individuals with
experience applicable to the end item or ser-
vice delivered. In other words, make sure
they are capable of understanding what the
contract monitors are telling them.
Third, the Fee Determination Official
(FDO) should be no higher than one level
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above the project manager and, in fact,
should be the project manager's line supervi-
sor. The FDO must have more than a passing
knowledge of the project's status. This re-
quires frequent interactions with the project
manager, which the supervisor's position pro-
vides. Deviations from this rule can result in
some awfully dumb fee determinations. I
might add that if the project manager reports
to the Center director, the deputy Center di-
rector should be the FDO. Center directors
should not be FDOs and should be reserved to
resolve institutional or project issues should
they arise.
Fourth, use adjectives that can be under-
stood and that properly describe perfor-
mance levels. I prefer the academic model
where "Satisfactory" is used for barely pass-
ing performance (a 60 or 70 percent perfor-
mance rating, depending on your preferences.)
Levels below "Satisfactory" can be identified
as "Poor" and "Failing." Levels above "Satis-
factory" can be called "Good" and "Excellent."
It's confusing to everyone when fee curves are
set so that the fee letter indicates a contractor
got a "Superior" rating but received only 65
percent of the available fee for that period.
Don't laugh; that's actually happened.
Fifth, skew the fee curve (fee earned vs.
performance rating) so that most of the
available fee falls above "Satisfactory," or
whatever you've decided to call passing per-
formance. This clearly shows our desire for
high performance and motivates the contrac-
tor to exceed a mere passing grade.
Sixth, make the award fee periods suffi-
ciently long to allow time to correct defi-
ciencies after a mid-term review by the
project managers. I prefer six-month periods.
This allows the project managers to assess the
performance status three months into the pe-
riod in order to identify performance prob-
lems, and then still provides three months to
correct the situation before final evaluation
and scoring of that period's performance.
Periods of less than four months preclude this
important process.
Seventh, offer contractors an opportunity
to present self-assessments of their per-
formance to the PEB and the FDO. Some
contractors will choose not to do this, but the
invitation ought to be given. If the offer is ac-
cepted, I believe the PEB should hear the con-
tractor's self-assessment before making the fi-
nal rating. As an FDO, I definitely preferred
hearing the contractor's self-assessment be-
fore hearing the PEB's story. Frankly, I've
found that the major advantage of contractor
self-assessments is that they indicate faulty
government-contractor communication
which will kill a successful project more
quickly than anything I know.
Eighth, rollovers should be allowed in the
award fee plan but never promised. They
should be left to the discretion of the FDO and
result from recommendations by the PEB.
They should be used infrequently and always
targeted to specific events that have become
crucial to the success of the project. Specific
"go/no-go" performance criteria must be es-
tablished for these events and announced in
the fee letter for the period preceding the peri-
od in which the selected event falls.
Finally m and most importantly J the
contractor project manager and the gov-
ernment project manager must jointly
agree on milestones and criteria, and the
emphasis to be placed on each, before the
beginning of each award fee period. And
then everyone must stick to the agreements.
This won't eliminate disagreements with the
amount of fee awarded, but it does eliminate
surprises, which are simply unacceptable.
Nothing can kill an award fee process quicker
and demoralize contractors more -- than to
be "dinged" for something they didn't know.
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_Fee Determinations
Now let's look at the lessons learned in the
awards themselves. The first and most impor-
tant ground rule is: don't play games. If the
contractor earned all of the fee, by all means
award it. Don't fall into the trap of telling
yourself, "If I give 100 percent, the contractor
will start expecting it every time." Or: "The
contractor earned 100 percent, but I'll give 80
percent to give some room to improve." Or
just as bad: "If I give the contractor the 20
percent really earned, I'll get the project man-
ager fired." Awards that are too high or too
low are equally bad. Awards that are too high
tell the contractor to underperform and get
away with it. Awards that are too low tell the
contractor that no matter how hard the work
and how much the accomplishment, efforts
will be in vain. Both situations are bad and
will demoralize the contractor. Stick to the
prior agreements and award the fee consistent
with the actual performance. If the perfor-
mance is deficient and your awards are consis-
tently fair, you'll soon see the performance im-
prove. If the performance is good, and the con-
tractor is convinced that fees will be lost by
backsliding, the performance will remain
high. In case you didn't notice, the operating
word is fair. By the way, it's a good idea to
keep histograms for the percentage fee earned
as the program develops. If the awards have
been consistent (fair), you'll see the hills (good
times) and valleys (problems) that occur in
any development activity.
_ Award Fee Letter
Now for the important fee letter where you
tell the contractor about the determination.
Believe me, you can ruin a good award fee pro-
cess and all the work you've done by issuing
an award fee letter that no one understands.
It would be impossible to overstate the impor-
tance of these letters. I've found the letters
should have four basic parts. The first para-
graph is really a boilerplate paragraph that
references the contract title and number,
identifies the period for which the award is
given, states the percentage of the award
earned and the specific dollar amount, and
gives the performance adjective rating. The
second paragraph should identify the in-
stances of commendable performance. Be spe-
cific, even if you have to use bulleted items.
Be clear. The contractor must understand
which ratings were high so as to pass the acco-
lades along to the working troops. The third
paragraph should identify deficiencies.
Again, it's extremely important to be specific
and clear. I call the final fourth paragraph
the "message" paragraph. The content of this
paragraph can range from "keep up the good
work" to "be advised that continued inferior
performance in (a certain area) will have seri-
ous effects on future overall fee determina-
tions."
A good contractor general manager will do
several things with the fee letter -- that is, if
it is understood. First, a meeting with the
project manager will be held to review the let-
ter. The project manager will be commended
for the things done properly (second para-
graph), actions will be identified to correct re-
currence of the deficiencies (third paragraph),
and the message (fourth paragraph) will be
discussed and actions (project or institutional)
will be identified to respond to the thrust of
the message. Next, the good general manager
will send a letter to the FDO stating that the
award has been reviewed with the project
manager, the recognition of the commendable
items is appreciated, the deficiencies and mes-
sage are understood, and appropriate actions
have been assigned. In addition, the general
manager will now be in a good position to re-
port the profit status on this contract and ar-
ticulate the details of the award. All of these
good things transpire when the contractor un-
derstands the fee letter. Otherwise, there is
no followup or feedback, the situation cannot
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be explained to corporate reviewers, and ev-
erybody loses.
The understanding of the awarded fee is so
important that I added one more step to the
process. As an FDO, if a general manager
called and verbally complained about certain
elements of the award, I would discuss the call
with the government project manager and
provide verbal feedback to the general man-
ager. If the complaint came in writing, I
would reconvene the PEB with instructions to
draft a written response to only the specific
concerns stated in the general manager's let-
ter, not every element of the award. I would
then discuss the recommended government
response with the PEB. If I agreed with the
PEB position, I would send the written re-
sponse to the general manager. By the way, I
have changed a prior award in the contractor's
favor after learning that the PEB used errone-
ous information. In that case, the general
manager was correct and the contractor
earned the fee increase. After all, that was
the fair thing to do. The contractor response
to that small dollar change was tremendous,
and performance improved markedly.
So in summation, I believe that award fee con-
tracting is particularly suited to the one-of-a-
kind development projects which constitute
most of NASA's efforts. I do not believe fixed
price contracts or fixed price plus incentive
contracts belong in this environment. Per-
haps someone else may wish to argue the ad-
vantages of the latter types, but my exper-
ience suggests that award fee contracting is
the better way to go.
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COBE's three instruments will be able to observe, map and measure the entire sky twice during its I year mission
lifetime. COBE, which includes the FIRAS instrument, is 19 ft (6 m) long and 29 ft (9 m) in diameter once the ar-
rays are extended. The instruments measure radiation from a variety of objects in space and the cosmic back-
ground radiation of the "Big Bang."
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COBE: Lessons Learned from the Management of FIRAS
by Mike Roberto
On November 18, 1989, NASA launched the
COsmic Background Explorer (COBE) from
Vandenburg Air Force Base in California.
COBE's mission is to orbit 559 miles above the
Earth for one year to study the origin and dy-
namics of the universe by measuring diffuse
infrared radiation and microwaves, including
the cosmic background. COBE will also test
the "Big Bang" theory of the origin of the uni-
verse, predicated 15 billion years ago.
COBE is carrying three principal instruments
to map the sky at 100 microwave and infrared
wavelengths. The Differential Microwave Ra-
diometer (DMR) is looking to see whether the
original explosion was equally bright in all di-
rections, or whether patchy brightness will
unveil the origins of galaxies, clusters of gal-
axies, and clusters of clusters of galaxies. The
Diffuse Infrared Background Experiment
(DIRBE) is searching for the light of the oldest
stars and galaxies by measuring the collective
glow of millions of objects, accounting for all
known sources of emissions, and seeing what
signals remain. The third instrument is the
Far Infrared Absolute Spectrophotometer
(FIRAS), which measures the spectrum of the
cosmic background radiation from the "Big
Bang" and intergalactic dust. A smooth black
body spectrum with small deviations is pre-
dicted. Any deviation may indicate other
powerful energetic events from the period of
universal history shortly after the "Big
Bang," such as annihilation of antimatter,
matter swallowed by black holes, or super-
massive exploding objects.
FIRAS was designed, built, and integrated at
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. The en-
tire process was kept in-house, the first time
such a complex project had been done this
way. While the outcome was successful, the
process did not always go smoothly. Follow-
ing are some of the lessons learned from this
experience.
1. Matrix management
Problem: Four divisions and numerous
branches of Goddard's Engineering Director-
ate provided excellent support to FIRAS.
However, the support personnel had other
concurrent responsibilities and were not un-
der the direct control of the FIRAS manage-
ment team. Because they were not always
available, more flexibility was needed in the
schedule.
Solution: With limited personnel resources,
there is no easy solution here. There is a
trade-off between keeping support personnel
in their organizations where they can inter-
face with peers on technical problems and co-
locating a team to support the instrument.
2. Breadboarding vs. system modeling
Problem: Too much time was spent develop-
ing breadboard subsystems, making the proj-
ect too much like experimental research. A
lot of time was spent varying parameters to
arrive at the right recipe for the operation of
temperature controllers.
Solution: Have good analytical capability for
modeling from the beginning. Then you can
run computer simulations, changing param-
eters and predicting results. Use system
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modeling extensively in the beginning of the
process, before breadboarding. During most of
FIRAS integration and testing, we did not
have an analysis program to predict the prop-
er temperature controller settings. After the
analytical model was developed, establishing
settings became routine and quick.
3. Peer level design reviews
Problem: The design reviews were not de-
tailed enough to catch subtle design problems.
For example, the mirror transport mecha-
nism (MTM) was a good mechanical design
but complex enough that proper assembly was
not immediately apparent. If the assembly
were not perfect, the mechanism would not
work properly. Parts were assembled at ambi-
ent temperature and cooled to near absolute
zero; components cool at different rates and to
different lengths.
Solution: Have experts perform a thorough
technology assessment early in the program.
Then you can find out early which parts of the
program need more emphasis and more work;
you can point out potential problem areas
which are technology drivers. Reviews should
be held at each level of maturity of design, so
that problems can be caught early, before the
hardware is cut. Peer reviews should be con-
ducted in small groups in a small conference
room where the diagrams can be put on a con-
ference table for people to review together.
The reviewers are thus more likely to discuss
the diagrams and to mark problem spots and
indicate solutions. When the review is held in
a large conference room with a large group
and the diagrams projected on a screen, the at-
mosphere is less conducive to criticism, dis-
cussion, and changes.
4. Comprehensive system level approach
to system design
Problem: The responsibility for the various
electronic subsystems of FIRAS was divided
among different branches and divisions.
Some FIRAS circuits required modification
late in the program. For example, the MTM is
extremely complex. We didn't find out how
noisy it was until it was installed on the
spacecraft; we then had to modify the elec-
tronics design of the shielding and grounding
to make it work properly. This including pig-
gybacking a box onto the drive electronics box
to eliminate noise and to ensure that the
MTM would recover from any scan upsets.
Before modification the mechanism would oc-
casionally go to the end of its course for a
while, where it drew excessive power. Once
the problems were corrected, it performed
flawlessly.
Solution: Early in the evolution of the elec-
tronic system design, the instrument team
needs to have an expert on grounding, noise
immunity, electronics components and inter-
faces, etc., to coordinate the overall system de-
sign. This skilled individual should have
overall responsibility for all the electronics.
5. Engineering model
Problem: The engineering model was deleted
from the program because of time and cost.
An engineering model could provide some
flight spare components as well as an instru-
ment for testing fixes on the ground before
trying to correct an on-orbit problem. The
FIRAS team ended up making changes to
flight hardware.
Solution: There is no easy solution here. An
engineering model of FIRAS would have been
more expensive and time-consuming than the
modifications made to the flight hardware.
However, for an instrument as complex as
FIRAS, I believe an engineering model would
have been good insurance.
6. Documentation
Problem: With the pressing schedule, the
3O
FIRAS team received hardware without its
documentation. The same people who sup-
plied the hardware had to prepare the docu-
mentation. To maintain the schedule, testing
had to proceed without all supporting docu-
mentation.
Solution: Insist that without complete docu-
mentation, the hardware is not considered to
be delivered.
7. Test requirements and schedule
Problem: In the FIRAS test program, tests
were sometimes shortened or deferred to a
higher level of integration to maintain the
schedule. FIRAS paid a price for trying to
maintain the schedule. The problem of the
Xcal (external calibrator) not staying in the
horn was not discovered until FIRAS was in
the flight dewar. The MTM drive electronics
required modification on the spacecraft, and
then a special electronics box had to be moun-
ted on the drive box (see #4). The lesson here
is that the risks of a success-oriented schedule
are very real.
Solution: There is no easy solution here ei-
ther. We're doing Monday morning quarter-
backing. The success-oriented schedule had
many successes, but going back into the dewar
was a big hit (costing us more time in the long
run). At times, a more flexible schedule would
have helped.
The FIRAS team could have fought harder for
additional time at certain critical points in the
program.
8. Software support
Problem: FIRAS was severely constrained by-
having to use the developing mission software
system for its instrument integration and
testing. The software was periodically modi-
fied as it was being developed as a ground sup-
port system for the mission. The integration
and test team had to use the same software;
when the version of the VAX operating sys-
tem was changed right before a test, the soft-
ware would not work properly for the integra-
tion and test team. The integration and test
effort was necessary for launch, but the team
felt they were being used as guinea pigs for
the new software, rather than having soft-
ware developed to support their efforts. They
had no control; they couldn't prevent the soft-
ware from being modified as they were pre-
paring to conduct a test.
Solution: Instrument integration and testing
needs independent, dedicated software sup-
port.
9. Programmed pauses
Problem: A number of times in the FIRAS
program, the FIRAS team fell behind sched-
ule. We were trying to prepare for the next
item on the schedule while also bringing test
procedures, test reports, etc., up to date. We
would get into a new test without having a
chance to completely evaluate the results of
the previous test. It was easier at times to run
a test again, rather than to go back and try to
process old data.
Solution: At times in a test program, it may
be necessary to stop everything and get up to
date. This may save time in the long run.
10. Common language
Problem: We tested FIRAS using one version
of STOL, a program for commanding the in-
strument from a computer. The spacecraft
has a slightly different version of STOL. The
POCC (payload operations control center) has
a significantly different version of STOL.
Solution: Use the same test language from
the start.
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11. Procedure changes
Problem: It was a rare event for a FIRAS test
procedure not to go through several iter-
ations.We made considerable extra work for
ourselves in developing and reviewing new
procedures for early orbit operations and the
FIRAS mission.
Solution: Develop procedures from the start
with inputs to cover all phases of the program.
This would require a lot of coordination in the
beginning, with procedures reviewed by sub-
system, engineering, science, and operations
personnel. However, the overall program
would be more efficient and more appropriate.
12. Personnel work hours
Problem: The COBE work has been exciting
and demanding. However, a work schedule
that runs through holidays, nights, and week-
ends for extended periods is usually not good
for the individual. Health and efficiency may
be affected. There should be a way to main-
tain a steady work pace that allows the indi-
vidual to keep up with responsibilities outside
of work.
Solution: There is no easy solution here.
Mandatory time off would mean that the proj-
ect would take longer and be more expensive.
At Goddard, projects are where the action is.
One could say that if you can't stand the heat,
get out of the kitchen. Some people want to
work lots of extra hours. However, since this
is now a "kinder and gentler nation," project
work could be made available for individuals
content with working more normal work
weeks.
_:_i_ Conclusions
People at Goddard received a lot of training
with the COBE project. Goddard benefitted as
a whole; it learned that it could handle a large
project in-house.
The FIRAS team was to a large extent captive
to the overall push to complete COBE. COBE
put an extraordinary demand on personnel,
money, and facility resources. Better plan-
ning might have allowed for more efficient re-
source utilization. As the magnitude of the
job became evident, it would have been help-
ful to conserve personnel resources by reduc-
ing night, weekend, and holiday work. Addi-
tional facility (and money) resources would
have been required, but there would have
been a better overall balance in resource utili-
zation.
In the end, everything came together. We are
very excited about how well FIRAS and the
other instruments are working. It is hard to
argue with success. Thus COBE may rein-
force our dependence on extraordinary person-
al efforts by our people. Any volunteers for
COBE 2?
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Management of Small Projects:
Streetfighting in the NASA System
by William J. Huffstetler
The NASA management system, as it has
evolved over the past three decades, is charac-
terized by larger projects. Ambitious plans,
bold directives, massive budgets, and tens of
thousands of workers characterize the most
spectacular achievements of NASA, yet all
during the huge Apollo and Shuttle programs,
NASA was involved in hundreds of smaller
projects, some of them totally unrelated to
their much bigger contemporaries, serving
the needs and aspirations of American and in-
ternational science and technology.
NASA counts some 20,000 "spinoffs" or
technologies twice used, about half of them
related to medical science. Many of these
spinoffs are the direct result of NASA's
smaller projects. NASA is one agency whose
parts are greater than the whole, whose sum
yield is higher than the total of projects.
What is a "small project" at NASA? It is de-
fined as any project not supported by a large
pipeline of dollars from a major program or
project. It can be a minuscule, stand-alone
part of a major program, but it usually has a
short life cycle, perhaps 18 to 36 months.
While it may have a lower priority in a NASA
Center's goals or objectives, a small project is
not considered extra, optional, or expendable
n it is considered a mandatory activity.
Murphy's Laws enable us to understand the
real beauty of a small NASA project. The
shorter life cycle of a small project goes a long
way in protecting us from Murphy's Four-
teenth Law: If you fool around with a thing
for very long, you will really screw it up. Most
of all, a small NASA project provides two im-
measurable benefits not ordinarily found in
mega-projects: considerable "hands-on," in-
house activities, and a marvelous opportunity
to have some fun. But to manage a small
project at NASA you need to know something
about the art of streetfighting.
_Like a Real Business
Managing small projects is the closest thing to
running a true business you can find inside
NASA, or within the government for that
matter. Small businesses have to streetfight
and most new businesses are knocked out in
two years or less. Streetfighting techniques
can be applied to small government projects as
well.
First of all, the first decision for a private
business is selection of a product line. NASA
does this every day, examining the needs of
the nation and the projects to meet various
conflicting and shifting priorities, to the satis-
faction of Center goals.
Next comes evaluation of competition. True
businesses merely have to study other produc-
ers in order to begin planning and market
strategy, but competition within NASA can
come from many sources. Some are internal
(such as other funded projects), and some are
external (such as user needs). As the new
NASA manager on the block begins to street-
fight for a project he or she believes in, things
get rough. As Murphy notes, friends come and
go, but enemies accumulate.
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The common next step for private enterprise
is conceptualizing, a process that involves
both strategy and credibility. In planning,
you don't want to eliminate any idea or con-
cept initially -- but then, you do not want to
plan by committee, either. Near-term action
(two to four years) is easy, but long-term
strategy (four to eight years) will require
phases for major decision points. The idea is
to gain credibility for the project by breaking
new ground -- in small pieces, not big
chunks.
The business world next considers risk as-
sessment. For managers of small projects,
technical and programmatic risks should be
distinguished. I would assume minimum risk
technically and maximum risk programmati-
cally. The turtle moves forward only when its
neck is sticking out from its protective shell.
Marketing comes next in small business:
selling and convincing people of the concept.
For small projects, that means internal sell-
ing. Establish a visible "golden cookie" for all
those from whom you need support. What's in
your project for them? How are the organiza-
tion's aims and aspirations reflected in this
small project? Market yourself as a leader --
managers are a dime a dozen, but leaders are
worth millions. Convince others that you can
handle the project, but remember that major
conflicts will come from within.
So a continuing process of reinforcement is re-
quired to sustain commitments. Murphy
warns, however, that if you try to please ev-
erybody, nobody will like it. Commit yourself
to the project, and convince others. Lead,
don't follow, in the marketing of your small
project.
Can you deliver the small project on time, on
budget, with the people assigned to you? To
be sure, take a chapter from the business
book and do some "resource projections."
Think twice about assurances of success until
you have the people, dollars, and schedule.
You may be asked to do a "cost-to-benefit"
study, as commonly practiced in thebusiness
world. While some people claim that if gov-
ernment were a business, it would go out of
business, others would say that government is
there to take risks in order to push technology
and expand the frontiers of science. Even if
the numbers look bad, lead -- don't follow the
numbers. Use the numbers, don't be used by
them, for strong leadership is mandatory on
small projects.
:_ Acquisition and Implementation
So you sold the project. Now what do you do?
Acquisition and implementation is the cus-
tomary final phase of a typical business plan
outlined above, but I want to spend some time
on this. Most people would think you put all
your energy into design, development, test,
and certification. That's the easy part of the
project.
The hardest part is requirements.
Developing strong yet flexible requirements
can make or break a small project. While it is
estimated that one hour of planning can save
perhaps three or four hours of execution, Mur-
phy adds that anything you try to fix will take
longer and cost more than you could imagine.
Changes occur at the blink of an eye. They
may come from any direction, friend or foe.
But the major syndrome, costing valuable
time and money, is: "I forgot."
The key to successful acquisition is control,
but such control must be self-imposed, and,
more important, self-maintained. Let George
do it, and George should have your job. Throw
out your plans and strategy, and here comes
trouble.
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Throughout the implementation of a small
project (and most large ones as well), the man-
ager discovers the necessity of a continuing
process in justifying the project's existence.
Here come budget cuts. Can we still proceed?
Here come new priorities. Can we adapt to
them? And where did all the project's advo-
cates go? You left it to George, and George
left.
At this point you had better control the risks,
for, as Murphy observed, the light at the end
of the tunnel is actually the headlamp of an
oncoming train.
There is no such thing as an optimum organi-
zation. There are only good leaders. And then
there are managers. Anyone can manage, but
few can really lead.
In practical terms for small projects, this
means giving maximum authority to project
engineering and project managers. It starts
with honesty: you do not and cannot know ev-
erything about everything. Develop close re-
lationships with subordinates in a spirit of
honesty and trust. Be flexible and adjustable,
reducing tensions as much as possible. Above
all, develop leaders, not merely more manag-
ers.
An organization is strengthened when it be-
comes an organism, when your team numbers
know and feel personally responsible for their
work. Authority is delegated to the lowest
possible level, and commitment to the project
rises to the maximum.
Some managers are continually on the look-
out for project visibility. If it's visibility you
want, have a failure while all else on the
flight is nominal. Maximum visibility, how-
ever, does not necessarily result from a totally
successful flight project; rather, it is provided
by project products that fly.
Visibility in an organization is a tricky con-
cept. Support for projects will appear to be to-
tally nil -- or you will be helped to death.
Visibility is not always desirable for an orga-
nization. A genuine leader will recognize oth-
ers on the team but will not seek personal rec-
ognition.
N_ii}i!i_So, Why Manage Small Projects?
You want to manage small projects because
the rewards are so great.
On a small project, rewards are more personal
than tangible. Success is sweeter for some-
thing over which you have major (though nev-
er total) control. And the personal relation-
ships, good and bad, built up over the lifetime
of a small project will stay with you for the
rest of your life.
Those relationships are based upon building
leadership through responsibility and author-
ity delegation. The small project is the per-
fect mechanism for educating younger per-
sonnel by integrating them with oldtimers.
With the Apollo-era engineers and techni-
cians retiring at an alarming rate, their wis-
dom finds no better place to live on than in
the hearts and minds of those working so
closely together on a small project.
One venerable oldtimer, now officially re-
tired, is Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson who cre-
ated his famous "Skunk Works" at Lockheed
in 1943.
The "Kelly Johnson factor" is a true educa-
tional experience in both learning and teach-
ing, perfectly suited to the management of
small projects. Kelly proved that projects led
by small committed project teams could be
fun as well as challenging, and some of his
precepts are paraphrased and outlined on the
next page.
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Basically, Kelly Johnson pulled a few good
people together, gave them authority from be-
ginning to end, and let them tackle tough
problems with the simplest of tools and meth-
ods. In a mere 43 days, ten dozen people, in
cluding 23 engineers, built the first U.S. fight-
er plane to fly faster than 500 mph. With un-
expected shared authority, this team focused
on a single, clear objective and had enormous
fun achieving it. Managers of small projects
at NASA would do well to reflect upon what
Kelly Johnson learned and taught.
Kelly Johnson's
SKUNK WORKS: BASIC OPERATING RULES
1. The manager delegates practically complete control of the program in all aspects; re-
ports go to highest level.
2. The projects office is small, but strong.
3. The number of people having any connection with the project is restricted in an "almost
vicious manner."
4. The drawing and drawing release systems are very simple, with great flexibility in mak-
ing changes.
5. Required reports are at a minimum, but important work must be recorded.
6. Monthly cost reviews cover what has been spent and committed, and projected costs to
completion.
7. The contractor must be delegated and must assume more than normal responsibility for
good bids on subcontract project work.
8. Existing inspection systems are used, with more basic inspection sent back to subcon-
tractors and vendors. Don't duplicate.
9. The contractor delegates authority to test the final product in flight.
10. Specs applying to hardware must be agreed to in advance of contracting.
11. Funding must be timely.
12. Mutual trust is sustained between project organization and the contractor. Closest coop-
eration is on a day-to-day basis.
13. Access to the project by outsiders is strictly controlled.
14. Ways must be provided to reward good performance.
-- See Chapter 16, "It's No Secret," of Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson's Kelly: More Than
My Share of It All (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Press, 1985), reviewed in Issues in
NASA Program and Project Management, NASA SP-6101(02).
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Age Distribution Among NASA Scientists and Engineers
by Michael L. Ciancone
The loss of technical expertise through attri-
tion in the technical work force is a growing
concern throughout NASA and the aerospace
industry, and may impact on the way NASA
manages projects. An unusual distribution of
age groups among scientists and engineers
(S&Es) within NASA presents both chal-
lenges and opportunities to NASA managers.
This article documents historical age-related
S&E information within NASA in general,
and the NASA Lewis Research Center
(LeRC), Cleveland, Ohio, in particular, for
1968 through 1988, and discusses the implica-
tions for NASA managers. Recommendations
are made for addressing the age distribution
issue to provide a practical approach for avoid-
ing adverse consequences and for allowing us
to take advantage of opportunities that may
arise.
The reputation of any technical organization
is based on the individuals who comprise its
work force, including both supervisory and
nonsupervisory S&Es. These individuals
form the core of the organization's technical
and programmatic memory. It is essential to
the viability of these organizations that they
maintain a critical core of experienced indi-
viduals. Equally important is the need to at-
tract, develop, and retain individuals who will
comprise the agency work force in the years to
come. This is the challenge of balancing
short-term needs (i.e., utilizing existing ex-
perience to meet current demands) and long-
term needs (i.e., developing new talent to
meet projected demands).
Early in the U.S. civilian space program, fol-
lowing the formation of NASA in 1958, many
S&Es were hired directly out of college by
NASA, supplementing those who made the
transition from the former NACA and those
who were drawn from military programs.
These young S&Es acquired invaluable exper-
ience as they matured along with NASA
through the U.S. civilian manned space pro-
grams, including the Mercury, Gemini, and
Apollo programs.
In the late 1960s, forces external to NASA
(e.g., congressional and administration priori-
ties, and budget constraints) dictated a de-
crease in the size of the NASA workforce (and
a corresponding decrease in the number of
S&Es) as the Apollo program drew to a prema-
ture close.1 More recently, an influx of new
hires in the early 1980s has helped to bolster
the NASA S&E base in support of a revital-
ized mission, including programs such as
Space Station Freedom. As a result, we are
faced with a combination of a large number of
S&Es nearing retirement age, a shortage of
mid-career S&Es, and a large cadre of rela-
tively inexperienced S&Es. Aggravating the
situation is an anticipated downturn in the
number of S&E graduates who will be avail-
able to the agency in the coming years.
If we assume that the S&Es hired in 1958
were recent college graduates with an average
age of 22, then these employees will be eligi-
ble to retire under the existing Civil Service
Retirement System (CSRS) in 1991, i.e., with
at least 30 years of service and at 55 years of
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age. Current personnel statistics reflect an
average retirement age among NASA S&Es of
60.2 The impact produced by the introduction
of the Federal Employee Retirement System
(FERS), supplanting the "golden handcuffs" of
the CSRS, have yet to be fully determined.
The following information was obtained from
raw data and annual work force summary re-
ports prepared by the NASA Personnel Evalu-
ation and Analysis Division for the years 1968
through 1988 to determine our current situa-
tion in light of relevant historical trends.
NASA S&Es are defined by the following posi-
tion categories: support engineering and re-
lated positions, aerospace technology (AST)
S&E positions, and life science positions.
Support engineering and related positions in-
clude professional physical science, engineer-
ing, and mathematics positions in work situa-
tions not identified with aerospace technol-
ogy. AST S&E positions include professional
scientific and engineering positions requiring
AST qualifications, and professional positions
engaged in aerospace research, development,
operations, and related work including the de-
velopment and operation of specia!ized facili-
Total
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1963 1968 1973 1978 1983
Years
Figure 1. - NASA Civil Service Workforce
ties, and supporting engineering. Life science
positions include life science professional posi-
tions not requiring AST qualifications, and
medical officers and other positions perform-
ing professional work in psychology, the bio-
logical sciences, and professions that support
the science of medicine such as nursing and
medical technology.
Figure 1 shows the general trend in both the
total number of NASA civil service workers
(CSs) and the number of CS S&Es. However,
Table 1 indicates that, throughout the vari-
ations in the size of the NASA CS workforce,
the percentage of S&Es in the total NASA CS
workforce increased -- from 36.5 percent in
1963 to 54 percent in 1988. This increase was
not unexpected as many former CS, non- S&E
YEAR
1963
1964
1965
1966
1968
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
TOTAL
28,358
31,285
32,697
33,538
33,677
32,471
31,733
31,223
29,478
27,428
25,955
24,854
24,333
24,039
23,569
23,169
22,633
21,613
21,844
21,186
21,505
21,050
21,423
21,228
21,831
21,991
S&Es
10,340
11,893
12,838
13,282
13,681
13,851
13,839
13,837
13,227
12,616
12,085
I1,770
11,665
11,612
11,544
11,465
11,291
11,200
10,923
10,746
11,094
10,879
11,144
11,147
11,679
11,866
S&Esas
a percent
of total
36.5
38.O
39.3
39.6
40.6
42.7
43.6
44.6
44.9
46.O
46.6
47.4
47.9
48.3
49.O
49.5
49.9
49.5
50.0
50.7
51.6
51.7
52.0
52.5
53.5
54.O
Table 1. - NASA Civil Service Workforce
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positions were converted to positions involv-
ing activities that could be provided by pri-
vate industry. Although these mandated con-
versions contributed to the depletion of in-
house talent, a conscious effort was made by
NASA management to retain the technical
expertise of the S&E workforce as much as
possible.
Figure 2 illustrates the changing age distribu-
tion among NASA S&Es, at 10-year intervals.
Table 2 tabulates the NASA S&E age data for
1968 through 1988. NASA has gone from a
"young" agency in 1968 during the height of
Apollo, to a somewhat normal age distribution
in 1978, to the current bimodal age distribu-
tion.
A bimodal age distribution, i.e., with two dis-
tinct peaks or modes, may preclude a smooth
personnel transition as experienced senior
._ _,,_"[ ]____" _ YEAR1968..... 1978
_t, ,¢ "_% 1988
Z I]
tJader 25 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-,_1 55-59 Over 59
AGE, YEARS
Figure 2. - Age Distribution Among NASA
Scientists and Engineers
S&Es are succeeded by available personnel,
consisting of a relatively few mid-career S&Es
and relatively inexperienced S&Es. Since
1968, 19 to 23 percent of the total S&E popu-
AGE RANGE
YEAR
( 25 25 - 29 30- 34 35- 39 40 - 44 45 - 49
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
633
459
381
286
135
89
108
153
186
167
2,168
1,946
1,718
1,396
1,109
801
606
521
468
456
2,945
2,849
2,658
2,435
2,185
2,000
1,769
1,537
1,308
1,063
2,767
2,829
2,914
2,837
2,746
2,594
2,524
2,408
2,264
2,072
2,136
2,150
2,235
2,243
2,383
2,517
2,541
2,608
2,662
2,574
176 503
199 503
349 598
317 666
328 710
602 8O9
557 909
636 1,168
549 1,375
627
522
1,612
1,755
874
728
725
725
66O
709
706
781
887
1,055
1,243
1,928
1,744
1,544
1,343
1,159
958
842
837
862
916
993
2,528
2,475
2,379
2,212
2,060
1,940
1,723
1,508
1,327
1,229
1,102
1,874
2,097
2,167
2,103
1,950
1,900
1,888
1,962
2,050
2,314
2,406
2,482
2,562
2,551
2,475
2,454
2,379
2,269
2,120
2,044
1,960
50-54
815
9OO
1,085
1,248
1,452
1,559
1,684
1,701
1,738
1,685
1,683
1,671
1,733
1,772
1,927
2,049
2,091
2,171
2,207
2,206
2,253
55 - 59 >-- 60
347 166
406 203
472 207
477 202
453 203
467
486
594
736
974
1,098
1,175
977
952
966
1,034
1,074
1,137
1,183
1,307
1,328
TOTAL
13,851
13,839
13,837
13,227
12,616
158 12,085
164 11,770
181 11,665
200 11,612
239 11,544
269 11,465
314 11,291
333 11,200
385 10,923
461 10,746
539 11,094
598 10,879
637 11,144
637 11,147
683 11,679
710 11,866
Table 2. - Number of NASA Scientists and Engineers
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lation has consistently been concentrated in
the peak age group. The percentage of S&Es
between 30 and 50 years of age has steadily
decreased since 1970, while the percentage of
S&Es over 50 has steadily increased (al-
though at a slightly lower rate of increase
than the rate at, which the percentage be-
tween 30 and 50 decreased). In addition, the
decreasing trend in the percentage of S&Es
under 30 was reversed about 1980. As of
1988, 19 percent of NASA S&Es are under 30,
and 36 percent are over 50.
The NASA-LeRC data represents a microcosm
of NASA's S&E age distribution trends. Fig-
ure 3 presents NASA-LeRC S&E data (tabu-
lated in Table 3), comparable to the NASA
S&E data presented in Figure 2. During this
time period, NASA-LeRC S&Es constituted
10 to 13 percent ofNASA's S&E work force.
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Figure 3. - Age Distribution Among NASA
LeRC Scientists and Engineers
Figure 4 illustrates that the average age of
NASA's S&Es increased at a rate of 0.65
years/year between 1968 and 1978. NASA's
AGERANGE
YEAR
(25 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45.49 50-54 55-59 >60
1968 56 271 340 355 301 296 118 53 22
1969 35 233 321 342 294 326 138 57 32
a1970 27 194 312 331 302 329 170 66 28
1971 19 154 302 320 309 332 202 75 23
1972 12 102 271 306 308 287 238 73 31
1973 6 66 223 265 300 260 249 67 22
1974 5 43 188 256 286 245 245 73 22
TOTAL
1,812
1,778
1,757
1,736
1,628
1,458
1,363
1975 6 38 153 254 271 265 242 89 25 1,343
1976 18 34 Ill 244 270 262 250 128 31 1,348
1977 25 36 90 230 260 268 240 158 32 1,339
1978 28 40 64 209 253 276 228 173 43 1,314
1979 29 42 58 177 247 285 220 197 47 1,302
1980 27 50 57 141 251 266 244 155 47 1,238
1981 19 59 52 116 240 253 226 157 61 1,183
1982 33 66 49 96 226 239 212 151 72 1,144
1983 133 98 80 73 213 236 227 148 88 1,296
1984 122 112 79 64 180 240 233 156 91 1,277
1985 114 176 87 74 146 247 226 173 94 1,337
1986 46 218 92 75 122 231 230 161 104 1,279
1987 56 249 127 92 108 228 229 164 120 1,373
1988 32 231 174 101 90 190 242 195 137 1,392
Table 3. - Age Distribution Among NASA LeRC Scientists and Engineers
a Figures for 1970 were obtained through interpolation of the data from 1969 and 1970
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Figure 4. - Average Age of NASA
Scientists and Engineers
S&E aging trend, both at LeRC and through-
out the agency, has stabilized since 1979, pri-
marily as a result of the infusion of S&E new
hires and the inevitable loss of senior S&Es.
_ Recommendations
The following list of recommendations ad-
dresses several facets of a plan of action that
will allow us to take advantage of opportuni-
ties and successfully face challenges. It in-
cludes measures that are extensions of or vari-
ations on existing NASA initiatives and is in-
tended to be as practical as possible to facili-
tate implementation at the lowest possible or-
ganizational level without necessitating ei-
ther an act of Congress or an act of God.
Hire Experienced S&Es
Perhaps the most obvious course of action
when faced with a low level of in-house exper-
ience is to look outside the organization for
available talent. However, it may not be fea-
sible to replenish the pool of experienced per-
sonnel by hiring from outside NASA if the bi-
modal age distribution among NASA S&Es is
indicative of the situation in the aerospace in-
dustry in general. Discussions with S&Es in
the private sector indicate that this seems to
be the case.
The size of the available S&E employment
pool in the U.S. work force cannot be stated
with certainty, but it has been reported that
upwards of 50 percent of those earning B.S.
degrees in S&E-related fields transfer out of
the S&E field.3,4 This loss of available talent
was perhaps most evident during the down-
turn in aerospace industry employment dur-
ing the 1970s. More recently, events in east-
ern Europe have led to speculation that a re-
duction in the funding of military programs
will lead to the greater availability of exper-
ienced S&Es from the military side of the
aerospace industry. However, this merely re-
presents an additional factor in an already un-
certain equation.
The availability of new S&Es is not expected
to improve in the near future -- forecasts are
that there will be an increase in the demand
for engineers through the 1990s, while the
supply will be decreasing, primarily as a re-
sult of the busted baby boom reducing the size
of the traditional pool of students entering
S&E fields.5,6 The issue of attracting students
to S&E fields, a "pipeline" issue, will not be
addressed here.
An additional source of experienced S&Es
that should not be overlooked are recent re-
tirees. These experienced retirees can be uti-
lized through support service contractors or as
private consultants when comparable, but un-
available, S&Es are needed. The 1989 enact-
ment of Public Law 100-679 (Post Employ-
ment Restriction Act) placed restrictions on
post-employment activities for former federal
procurement officials and resulted in acceler-
ating the retirement of some employees, but
any long-term effect on retirement statistics is
likely to be negligible. Further complicating
this situation was the recent suspension of
PL 100-679 by Congress until December 1,
1990.
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Although contentious, the use of retirees via
support service contracts or as private consul-
tants is particularly appealing when person-
nel funding (R&PM) is limited, but contract-
ing funds (R&D) are available. Such an effort,
however, should not detract from the develop-
ment of an in-house technical workforce. In
essence, it only serves to postpone the inevita-
ble transition of experience.
Regardless of the success of our efforts to hire
experienced S&Es from outside NASA, we
must ensure that we do not neglect the devel-
opment of the in-house pool of talent that is al-
ready available.
_ Increase Awareness
One of the easiest ways to deal with an issue is
to heighten awareness of the issue among the
people most affected. This is possible, for ex-
ample, through articles (such as this one) in
employee newsletters and technical publica-
tions, and in briefings to the technical work-
force (particularly as part of orientation and
retirement seminars). The personnel who
comprise the technical work force will deter-
mine the future viability of NASA. If the is-
sue is credible and gains grassroots accep-
tance, then individual actions addressing the
issue will become a matter of routine rather
than a result of formal policy. For example,
the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)
Office at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center,
Greenbelt, MD, has provided first-line super-
visors with the opportunity to attend a one-
day, in-house training program on "Managing
Age Diversity."
I Support EmployeeDevelopment Programs
While we may be limited in our ability to hire
additional S&Es, we can and should continue
to support programs that provide employees
with opportunities to develop greater techni-
cal or managerial experience. These pro-
grams constitute an investment by the agency
in its future that requires commitment at all
levels of management. A critical element to
the success of these programs is the support of
first-line management. These are the manag-
ers who are in the trenches and who must bal-
ance the long-term developmental needs of
their employees (in the interest of the employ-
ee and the agency) with the near-term de-
mands of the group activities (in the interest
of the tasks at hand).
Most obvious among these programs are the
continuing and graduate education programs
that enable NASA employees to pursue de-
grees of higher education during their em-
ployment or to enhance their technical educa-
tion. Less obvious, perhaps, is the "continuing
education" that occurs when employees attend
professional and technical meetings where in-
formation is shared and valuable contacts are
made throughout the industry. Such activi-
ties may be viewed as a form of '_continuing
education" for experienced employees, insofar
as the activity enhances their ability to suc-
ceed on the job.
Other NASA programs provide for non-
academic personnel development. NASA's
Professional Development Program (PDP), for
example, allows selected NASA personnel to
participate in a one-year developmental pro-
gram at NASA Headquarters or a NASA Cen-
ter. The program is intended to provide the
opportunity for individuals to broaden their
technical and programmatic experience, as
well as to gain an understanding and appre-
ciation of the culture and perspective of other
organizational elements within NASA. More
emphasis on inter- and intra-Center assign-
ments should also be considered.
_:_ Document and DisseminateInfor ation
Valuable information can be lost if adequate
and timely documentation of technical and
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managerial information does not occur.7 All
too often, formal documentation does not oc-
cur until a program or project is either can-
celled or completed, and "lessons learned" be-
come "lessons lost" as key employees move on
to other assignments and personal files are ei-
ther discarded or sent into storage.8
Policies should be established and promoted,
particularly by relevant program and project
managers, that facilitate the documentation
and dissemination of technical and manage-
ment information. In the case of detailed,
technical design data, it will also be necessary
to provide updates to the information base as
new or revised information becomes available.
In general, this activity will necessarily in-
volve the efficient and widespread storage and
dissemination of information via electronic
media. On a more immediate level, the mass
of documentation associated with major pro-
grams, such as Space Station Freedom, is too
extensive for any individual to be familiar
with the bulk of it.
I Establish Deputy Manager Positions
Nothing provides better experience than on-
the-job training and experience. One possibil-
ity for accelerating the management "educa-
tion" of inexperienced employees would entail
the official or unofficial establishment and
promotion of temporary or rotating positions
for deputies to first-line managers. These po-
sitions would provide management experience
for qualified employees, while minimizing the
risks associated with placing an untrained in-
dividual in an unfamiliar, and perhaps, in ap-
propriate role. The non-permanent nature of
the position would avoid the appearance of a
demotion when the individuals return to their
former position, while maximizing the num-
ber of employees who could benefit from the
experience. Caution should nonetheless be
exercised to ensure that such positions do not
generate an undesirable, and possibly unnec-
essary, layer of bureaucracy.
I Establish Chief Engineer/ScientistPositions
Within programs and areas of technical exper-
tise, it is advantageous to the organization to
maximize the benefits available through the
experience of senior individuals. This organi-
zational need can be balanced by the benefit
accrued to the senior employee who has either
stagnated on the technical side of the dual-
career ladder, or who chooses to relinquish su-
pervisory responsibilities in favor of a more
technical, non-supervisory role. Ideally, this
is the situation encountered in establishing
positions for chief scientists and chief engi-
neers. These positions would enable a greater
number of individuals to benefit from exper-
ienced, non-supervisory S&Es, while provid-
ing highly-valued S&Es with greater visibil-
ity and enhanced recognition of their value to
both the group and the agency.
_ Implement TechnicalMentor Programs
Although established fresh-out mentoring
programs exist at several NASA Centers,
there does not appear to be an agency-wide po-
sition on mentoring. In some respects, each
program must necessarily be tailored to the
personality and culture of the particular Cen-
ter; however, there should be some program
characteristics that are common among men-
toring programs at all the Centers. An exam-
ple of a Center initiative is the Interactive De-
velopment of Engineers, Administrators, and
Scientists (IDEAS) program, at NASA Ames
Research Center (ARC), Mountain View, CA,
designed to better integrate new hires into the
ARC work force through interaction with
peers and highly regarded senior employees.
Participant feedback has shown that the long-
time employees involved in the program claim
a feeling of revitalization as a result of their
experiences within the program.
It is not enough to place an inexperienced in-
dividual in a position of responsibility, par-
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ticularly on long-term programs, when hard-
ware will not be produced for some time. A
pratical understanding of technical principles
is necessary if success is to be ensured.
We can serve two purposes by facilitating in-
teractions among experienced, long-time em-
ployees, and inexperienced fresh-outs or new-
hires- the new employees are more quickly
schooled in the culture and history of the orga-
nization, and technical insight and knowledge
can be passed along; and the long-time em-
ployees are presented with fresh, new perspec-
tives that sometimes break with accepted
lines of thinking. These interactions could
take the form of one-on-one pairings that pro-
vide both technical and cultural mentoring, or
they could take the form of small, low-cost,
low-risk technical projects that provide inex-
perienced personnel with the opportunity to
acquire invaluable hands-on experience.
Conclusions:
What the Age Distribution
Issue Means to NASA
Management
The challenge of balancing short-term needs
(i.e., utilizing existing experience to meet cur-
rent demands) and long-term needs (i.e., de-
veloping new talent to meet projected de-
mands) has increased for the NASA manager
due to the combination of a large number of
experienced S&Es nearing retirement age, a
dearth of mid-career S&Es, and a large cadre
of relatively inexperienced S&Es.
The character of the agency will certainly
change in the near future as the average age
and experience levels of our S&Es decrease.
As we strive to fulfill the requirements of new
and existing missions, we can prepare our
less-experienced S&Es to assume greater lev-
els of technical and managerial responsibility
at an earlier age. The resources that we have
at our disposal will be best directed in areas
over which we are able to exert the most con-
trol, such as the development of in-house tal-
ent.
The future promises both challenges and op-
portunities for the NASA manager. While we
may hope for the best, we should nonetheless
plan for the future in order to assure the con-
tinuity needed for increasingly complex mis-
sions.
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Resources for NASA Managers
The Program and Project
iF Management Collection
A special collection, The Program and Project
Management (PPM) Collection, has been es-
tablished at the NASA Headquarters Scienti-
fic and Technical (S&T) Library. The collec-
tion is part of the Program and Project Man-
agement Initiative, sponsored by the NASA
Office of Human Resources and Organization-
al Development.
The S&T Library maintains and lends docu-
ments from this collection to interested per-
sonnel through each of the NASA Center li-
braries. The collection includes books, semi-
nar proceedings, documents, and videos gath-
ered from Headquarters and the NASA Cen-
ters. Some of the materials include:
Books
Project Management: A System Approach
to Planning, Scheduling and Controlling by
Harold Kerzner, 1984.
Management: Tasks, Responsibilities,
Practices by Peter Drucker, 1974.
Computer Models for Operations Manage-
ment by Owen P. Hill, Jr., 1989.
Beyond the Atmosphere by Homer Newell,
1981.
Issues in NASA Program and Project Man-
agement, (NASA SP-6101) 1988 and
(NASA SP-6101(02)) 1989.
Documents
Getting on Contract, JPL D-1844, Rev. C
October 1987.
Management Directives Relevant to Typi-
cal Phase A, Phase B, and Phase C/D Re-
quest for Proposals, Marshall Space Flight
Center, Revision E, July 1987.
Technical Managers Handbook, Engineer-
ing Directorate, Goddard Space Flight Cen-
ter, May 1989.
Videos
Introduction to Proiect Management,
IEEE, Parts 1- 4, 1982.
Shared Experiences in NASA Projects, An-
gelo Guastaferro, April 21, 1989.
Prqiect Management at Johnson Space Cen-
ter, Aaron Cohen, December 7, 1989.
Explorer Satellites Program: Shared Ex-
periences, Gerald Longanecker, September
1989.
Proceedings
NASA Colloquium on Project Manage-
ment, 1980.
Project Management Institute Seminar/
Symposium, Several years running.
Materials from the PPM Collection are acces-
sible at each Center Library using the Aero-
space Research Information Network (ARIN).
ARIN is an online catalog to which all of the
NASA libraries contribute on a daily basis.
Any book added to a NASA library collection
can be located through the use of ARIN. Much
like a card catalog, ARIN may be searched by
title, author, or subject. The advantage of an
online system is its keyword searching capabi-
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lities. All of the materials in the PPM Collec-
tion have been "tagged" with a special code.
Using that special code in a keyword search
will display every title in the collection.
For example, to see a list of all the titles from
the collection, enter K = XPMX. Enter the line-
number to see the entire entry. You may
want to print the screen if you think the title
is of interest. To return to the list oftitles, en-
ter the letter i.
Because there will be many titles in the entire
collection you may want to limit your search
by subject:
K = XPMX SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
or you may know when a document was pub-
lished. Enter:
K = XPMX 1985
An author search may be entered like this:
K = XPMX CLELAND
There are many variations on keyword
searching. Ask your librarian for assistance.
The request will be handled quickly if you
have 8 title, author and call number, such as
"T56, 8 N37 1989." The request will be for-
warded to the NASA Headquarters S&T Li-
brary. After identifying the materials you
want to borrow, please relate pertinent infor-
mation to the reference desk at your NASA
Center library, which will expedite the re-
quest and get the material to your library as
soon as possible. You may keep the material
for one month. Exceptions will be considered
on an individual basis.
Additional questions concerning the collection
may be addressed to Char Moss, at FTS-453-,
or (202) 453-8545, who welcomes suggestions
from users on how to improve the collection
and what could be added. Donated materials
-- books, documents, videos, or proceedings --
are always needed. If you have any useful ma-
terials that would be of value or interest to
NASA management, forward them to the
Headquarters S&T Library where they can be
processed and made available to others. Out-
of-print books on NASA management and his-
torical reports on "lessons learned" from
NASA projects are particularly in demand.
Keep in mind that this collection is useful not
only for current NASA managers but also the
next generation of NASA managers as they
learn from the past and prepare for the future.
I A Crash Course in Defining'System Engineering'
Back on September 27, 1968, a NASA engi-
neer by the name of George S. Trimble wrote
to the Chief of the Management Analysis and
University Programs Office after the Chief is-
sued a letter to find a universally suitable
definition for "systems engineering." The en-
gineer told the manager that the term had no
particular meaning at all. "In fact," Trimble
claimed, "I may know the guy who thought it
up or resurrected it, as the case may be, for
modern usage." His seemingly authoritative
account follows:
"During the war, new management practices
were introduced at a great rate, and one of the
functions that came to the fore was the busi-
ness of writing job descriptions and evaluat-
ing them. Certain industrial relations experts
fell heir to this function, and there was a ten-
dency for them to write very clear job descrip-
tions for all jobs except their own. It soon be-
came obvious that the value of a job, or, more
importantly, the money it paid (or even more
importantly, its draft-dodging power), was in-
versely proportional to the ease with which
one could describe it. Industrial relations peo-
ple were able to describe any engineering job
in 25 words or less, whereas an industrial re-
lations function might take two or three
pages. Although miserable to begin with, en-
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gineering salaries were threatened and so was
draft status.
"Of course, everyone knows that engineers are
very creative. They could see that the indus-
trial relations boys had a good thing going, so
they borrowed the approach and improved on
it (typical engineering method).
"Soon it took five pages to describe the most
menial engineering task, and the engineers
were saved. It was a simple matter to spend
three hours explaining to a job analyst from
industrial relations why a 'systems engineer-
ing' blueprint file was much more complicated
to run than a simple old 'engineering' blue-
print file, which was, of course, familiar. The
guy from industrial relations never did under-
stand it because the guy who explained it,
didn't. It takes a lot of words to explain some-
thing you don't understand or that isn't there.
Try explaining 'zero' sometime.
"A parallel effort with the objective of empha-
sizing *!!ENGINEERING!I* was carried out
with great dispatch by the 'scientists,' all of
whom became famous at the close of WWII be-
cause a couple of them single-handedly in-
vented and built the A-bomb, all by them-
selves, with great secrecy. What they were
really doing all that time, of course, wasn't
science -- it was engineering. When this was
discovered, a mixed wave of nausea and terror
ran through the brotherhood. It was worse
than being caught reading a dirty book in
church. Most learned scientists knew that en-
gineers were people who ran around with spe-
cial hats and oil cans and made steam locomo-
tives g0, and who, incidentally, made too
much money. Being identified as part of the
same crowd was too much for the intellect to
bear. Scientists had to be working on some-
thing more important than 'engineering'
which is supervised by a Ph.D. and is there-
fore high-class and also obvious to those
schooled properly, but difficult if not impossi-
ble for anybody else to understand.
"Since, as we all know, very few, if any, Ph.Ds
understand the meaning of plain, ordinary
'engineering,' it follows that 'systems engi-
neering' has given engineering a bad name,
and should be avoided for that reason alone.
"A third group who helped the cause for sys-
tems engineering were the pre-war 'handbook'
engineers who discovered creative engineer-
ing when they joined up with a wartime in-
dustrial engineering group to avoid being
drafted. They had always thought that 'engi-
neering' was the choosing from a catalog of
the proper washer for a quarter-inch bolt. It
was difficult for them to use the same name
for their new discovery, creative engineering
(designing a washer for a quarter-inch bolt).
The term 'systems engineering' suited well,
and groups of people were noising it around by
then. It sounded nice and, after all, a quarter-
inch bolt is a fastening system of high com-
plexity. It consists of a bolt with threads (heli-
cal inclined plane), a nut of the proper size,
hand and thread configuration (bolt interface
problem), external shape (wrench interface
problem), one or more washers (structures in-
terface problem), and sometimes even a cotter
pin (reliability).
"Moreover, one could dream of performing
systems engineering at increased hierarchical
levels by considering at one and the same time
not only the quarter-inch bolt, but also the
half-inch bolt. Advanced systems engineer-
ing.
"So much for the history and meaning of sys-
tems engineering. You can demonstrate the
validity of my story to yourself in several
ways. Your letter can be clarified by eliminat-
ing the word 'systems.' I believe it appears 10
times. Check the universities for courses in
systems engineering and find out what they're
really teaching. Note also that the term 'sys-
tems engineering' does not yet appear in a an
accredited dictionary. This is because Web-
ster can't figure it out either. Good luck."
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Well, that was the extent of definition history,
according to engineer George Trimble in 1968.
But what about today? Is "systems engineer-
ing" a set, definable term in the dictionary to-
day? First stop, American Heritage Dictio-
nary -- no listing for "systems engineering."
Second stop, a Webster's. Indeed, the grand-
daddy of all dictionaries has it listed as an
"Americanism," a term indigenous to this
country. It reads:
systems engineering, a branch of
engineering using esp. information
theory, computer science, and facts from
systems analysis studies to design
integrated operational systems for
specific complexes.
All well and good, you suppose, but
whatexactly is "information theory" following
the "esp."? Turn back 722 pages and you find:
information theory, the study of pro-
cesses of communication and the trans-
mission of messages; specif., the study
dealing with the information content of
messages and with the probability of
signal recognition in the presence of in-
terference, noise, distortion, etc.
The "etc." may be imprecise, but just when
you think you are getting a handle on an up-
to-date definition of "systems engineering"
which has something to do with "information
theory," you get thrown off by another term:
"signal recognition." Not to worry, right? Be-
cause you can always look up that fuzzy term
for a clear, concise definition. But guess what:
"signal recognition" is not in Webster's (nor is
it in American Heritage Dictionary). Mr.
Trimble may have been right all along.
_ Pr0ject Management Body ofKnowledge (PMBOK)
by PMI Standards Committee
(Drexel Hill, PA: Project Management
Institute, 1987)
The hundred or so pages of PMBOK covers
nine areas of concentration: PM Framework
(Philip Nunn), Scope (Richard Cockfield),
Quality (William Dixon), Time (Joe R. Beck),
Cost (Peter G. Georgas and George Vallance),
Risks (David V. Pym), Human Resources
(John R. Adams and Linn C. Stuckenbruck),
Contract/Procurement (Shakir Zuberi), and
Communications Management (Shirl Hol-
ingsworth), plus an essay by R. Max Wideman
on PMBOK Standards and a glossary.
PMBOK was developed by a PMI Committee
in 1983 as an effort to describe and define the
knowledge necessary to function adequately
as a Project Management Professional. As
such, it became the official PMI basis for certi-
fication exams and review of graduate pro-
grams in September of 1988.
The effort itself was well thought out. Pur-
poses were to organize and classify in
PMBOK; to integrate, correlate, store, and re-
trieve, and "build on what we have." Charac-
teristics of the effort had to be simple, logical,
saleable, comprehensive, compatible, system-
atic, and understandable. As areas were
carved out, they were published in the Project
Management Quarterly (now Journal).
Stuckenbruck, in an overview section, illus-
trates the basic project management elements
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and functions in a matrix model which resem-
bles this:
Project Project Elements
Management
Functions
Jr Scope Quality Scheduled Cost Environment
I
Ptanning and
Control
Project
Integration
_esources
Risk
Human
Resources
Contacts and
Procurement
Informatton
and
Communications
Project Management Matrix Model
Wideman suggests that a simpler Work
Breakdown Structure (WBS), defined as a
task-oriented tree of activities, "is too restric-
tive for purposes of representing the
PMBOK," so the matrix model serves as the
framework for discussion of the PMI approach
to a project management body of knowledge.
Wideman traces the effort to produce a body of
knowledge on project management to 1976.
The main concerns then were standards, certi-
fication, accreditation, and a code of ethics to
establish project management as an indepen-
dent profession. By 1986, the PMI project
#121 had settled on a working definition: "A
project is any undertaking with a defined
starting point and objectives by which comple-
tion is identified. In practice, most projects
depend on finite or limited resources
by which the objectives are to be accom-
plished."
PMBOK is nicely printed with foldout charts
and diagrams in a looseleaf binder. As the
discipline or standards of project management
change, modified pages can be inserted easily.
And as the distinct profession of project man-
agement evolves, pages can be added.
PMBOK thus represents a strenuous effort on
the part of prominent management theorists
in the U.S. and Canada to reduce the common-
ly accepted essentials of project management
knowledge into one short, easy-to-read binder
with useful glossaries and references at the
end of each section.
The Management of ResearchInstitutions: A Look at Government
_ Research Laboratories
by Hans Michael Mark and Arnold Levine
(NASA SP-481. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984)
Starting with the assumption that "the great-
est strength of the technology development
laboratory is in basic and applied research
and not (with rare exception) in product devel-
opment," physicist Hans Mark and social sci-
entist Arnold Levine set out to analyze large
research institutions constrained by normal
financial limitations. For example, how does
a manager do medium- and long-range plan-
ning on an annual funding cycle?
Following a brief historical overview from the
Lyceum of Aristotle and Plato to the founding
of the British Royal Society, the authors focus
on the past two decades of NASA, DoD, and
the Nuclear Energy Development Center.
The "ultimate reality" for the authors are pro-
jects themselves, leading to some "practical"
applications of technology development. The
use of project methods is nothing new -- re-
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call the six-month construction of the Monitor
in 1862, the Manhattan Project, and the Apol-
lo Program. However, "the project approach
sometimes entails heavy penalties when it is
pushed to the exclusion of other approaches
and becomes a brute force effort to achieve a
goal, or freezes technology prematurely." No
better example serves them than Apollo, with
lunar landing as a "dead end." Had NASA se-
lected "earth-orbit rendezvous initially, the
lunar landing could still have been achieved
and NASA would have had at least a ten-year
start on deploying an orbiting space station,
rather than waiting until 1982 to let study
contracts for its design." The authors contrast
the "single-minded" Apollo program with the
"open-ended and continuing" Shuttle Pro-
gram and suggest that the Project Approval
Document (PAD) may no longer be possible
for NASA in some projects, due to their com-
plexity.
The authors make several assumptions about
the management of professional staff in large
research institutions. First, "there are no per-
sonnel policies which are guaranteed to work
across organizational lines." Such policies as
continuing education, indefinite or term em-
ployment, and rotating work assignments
may or may not work, depending on the orga-
nizational culture. Rather, they see personnel
issues as "synonymous with the organizations
goals." They quote Arnold Deutsch to the ef-
fect that technical people are best motivated
by the challenge of the work itself, as inspired
by the institution's environment. The steady
decline in large research institutions suggests
to the authors that they will change little but
also that an older work force will not mean ob-
solescence if the institution can transform sci-
entists and engineers into managers.
Can they? In a case study, the authors point
to NASA in the 1970s. Yes, scientists and en-
gineers can and do make good managers when
their loyalties are more to the organization-
than to their technical discipline. Many are
called to internships and supervisory training
programs, but few are chosen because of "a
narrowly, technical education," these authors
conclude.
The Management of Research Institutions is
amply illustrated with charts, illustrations,
and case studies, ending with an assertion
that the most precious of all qualities is the
human imagination, which enabled even
Andrei Sakharov to withstand stifling.
Imagination is best freed in a decentralized
system "where decision-making is not mono-
lithic but yet is well enough organized to
make the importance of science and technol-
ogy felt."
_ Organizing for Project Management
by Dwayne P. Cable and John R. Adams
(Drexel Hill, PA: Project Management
Institute, 1986)
This 34-page monograph is described as a
"concise yet readable" introduction to or re-
fresher in organizational alternatives. It is
not a guidebook or manual, but rather a brief
description of standard organizations on a
scale of no or low to high project managerial
authority: functional, expeditor, coordinator,
weak matrix, strong matrix and fully projec-
tized structures. Expeditor and coordinator
are described as subsets of functional organi-
zation, and the "fully projectized" organiza-
tion is defined as one in which the project
manager has total responsibility, with all the
personnel needs assigned to that one project.
The differences in structure and authority are
spelled out in a series of organizational charts,
including one repeated 10 pages later. Of
course, as the authors point out, "few large or-
ganizations involved in multiple projects use
any single form of organization" in pure form,
but selection of the best chart may be "an
enormous step from which there may be no re-
turn."
5O
Resources
ELLL£ LL LLLLLLLLLLLL [ F_[ LLLL L t LL L L L LLL LLLLLLLLLLLLL LL L LL t t LL t _ [* [ _ [ IlL LLL ]* LL L LLLLLL L [LLLLLLLLL LLL LL L LL LLL L L[[[t L_LLLLLLLLLLLLL[ LLL LL [[L L LL L LL LL •
While most of the outline and description
would be "old hat" to the seasoned or schooled
project manager, the authors do list 22 advan-
tages and disadvantages of a matrix organiza-
tion form. Particularly interesting is a section
on "Matrix Pathologies." They include Power
Struggles, Anarchy, Groupitis (confusing ma-
trix behavior with group decision making),
Collapse During Economic Crunch, Excessive
Overhead, Decision Strangulation (caused by
too many administrators), Sinking (when ma-
trix structure falls to lower management lev-
els), Layering (matrices within matrices), and
Navel Gazing (absorbed with internal oper-
ations to the detriment of the world outside
the organization).
_Team Building for Project Managers
by Linn C. Stuckenbruck and David Marshall
(Drexel Hill, PA: Project Management
Institute, 1988)
U.S.C. Professor Stuckenbruck and his re-
search assistant suggest that "team building"
is at the very core of project management, per-
haps even more important than technical
knowledge.
'_Even the best projects using the best tools are
not immune to failure," they say, claiming
that most troubled projects require "team
members to work together and provide out-
standing group performance."
To accomplish such team building, the au-
thors say "the cookbook approach" to manage-
ment, a recipe of tools and techniques, won't
work for projects, nor for a losing football
team. A project is "losing" or sick when there
are signs or symptoms of frustration, conflict,
and unhealthy competition, unproductive
meetings, or lack of confidence in the project
manager. An alert manager will turn the sit-
uation around by presenting the problem as a
challenge, giving regular review and feedback
on performance, using a team reward system
(such as visibility or recognition), encourag-
ing professional development (papers, work-
shops, and special training opportunities), en-
couraging healthy competition, and providing
a good environment for a wholesome place to
work with all the tools and support necessary
to excel. Clear and effective communication
are basic in such remedies. That is not to say
"team building" is a cure-all. The authors say
no amount of teamwork will save a project if
the project concept is faulty. Also, the lack of
top management support can undermine any
efforts towards team building. Finally, no
amount of team building will save hopelessly
unproductive people nor a hopelessly inept
manager.
Nevertheless, the authors insist that "team
building can very well be the most important
aspect of the project manager's job," and this
50-page booklet is a good start in the process.
Roles and Responsibilities of the
Project Manager
by John R. Adams and Bryon W. Campbell
(Drexel Hill, PA: Project Management
Institute, 1988)
In a mere 30 pages, the authors attempt to de-
scribe the functions of a typical project man-
ager, as well as the education and experience
needed for effectiveness. As such, these topics
are merely touched upon, making the booklet
a very broad overview of a few basic, common-
ly accepted generalizations.
However, the PMI booklet does contain a few
fresh topics on conflict resolution, derived
from a 1979 book co-authored by Adams. Con-
flict over planning, organizing, and control-
ling occur frequently over the span of a proj-
ect, and the authors suggest five resolution-
strategies. Most common is "confrontation,"
whereby the two parties face the problem di-
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rectly and work together toward a workable
solution. "Compromise" is a second method,
involving give and take. Another important
method, they suggest, is "smoothing" where
differences are played down and areas of
agreement are given the most attention.
Fourth is "forcing" a win-lose agreement,
where the project manager exerts power to im-
pose a solution. The least used is "withdraw-
al" or when one or both parties backs down
and gives up the conflict for the sake of the
project. The point is: the project manager is
expected to manage even conflict situations in
one of the five ways as part of the demanding
job.
"Experience is irreplacable as a learning tool
for managing people in a project, "the authors
assert, but formal education in management
is also desirable to complement a manager's
technical expertise. Typically, such a comple-
ment would be an MBA degree, although they
also suggest formal education in such areas as
psychology, labor relations, and law, plus in-
formal workshops in communication, group
dynamics, leadership, and, of course, conflict
resolution.
_Skill in Communication: A Vital
IElement in Effective Management
by David D. Acker (Defense Systems
Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985)
David Acker spent two decades with Rockwell
:n the Autonetics Division before becoming a
)rofessor of management at the Defense Sys-
em Management College. He asserts that
good communications are the source of good
management, and skill in communications is
essential to every other management skill."
Interactive communication is needed in any
organization, he says, for task coordination,
problem solving, information sharing, and
conflict resolution. The manager, before com-
municating, must have a purpose, know the
audiences' needs, select the right channel or
medium, and expect a specific kind of feed-
back. It sounds elementary, but these are use-
ful reminders.
Skills in presentations (public speaking), lis-
tening, reading, writing, and conducting
meetings are outlined from a managerial
point of view. Short chapters on non-verbal
communication, communication barriers, and
communication theory round out this handy,
pocket-size booklet of 86 pages.
While there is no attempt to provide depth,
the author does throw up some bewildering
terms like "kinesics" (related to something
called "movement analysis"), "paralanguage"
(not defined), and "noise barrier" (defined
mysteriously as "any communication problem
that can't be fully explained"). Nevertheless,
its brevity is the booklet's strength. This
booklet is a storehouse of useful tips to refer to
before a manager is called upon to speak,
present, read, write, or listen.
One insightful term which keeps popping up
in Skill in Communication is "empathy."
Acker suggests that the speaker or author
"can put yourself in the receiver's place and
analyze the message from his viewpoint." A
disclaimer in a footnote explains, but does not
justify, that the author is using the male ad-
jective as a literary term, in a generic sense.
Rhetoricians are saying now that the use of
sexist language is inexcusable. A sentence
that calls for a personal (male) pronoun is,
more often than not, a poorly constructed sen-
tence anyway.
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